

FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE LOW DUTY POLICY.

1847	\$ 23,747,864.66
1848	31,757,070.96
1849	28,346,738.82
1850	39,608,686.42
1851	49,017,567.92
1852	47,339,326.62
1853	58,981,865.52
1854	64,224,100.27
1855	53,025,794.21
1856	64,022,865.50
1857	63,875,905.05
1858	41,789,620.95
1859	49,550,416.04
1860	53,187,511.87
1861	39,582,125.64

Total.....\$708,067,548.46

FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE HIGH DUTY POLICY.

1862	\$ 49,056,897.62
1863	69,089,642.40
1864	102,816,152.99
1865	84,928,260.00
1866	179,046,651.58
1867	176,417,810.88
1868	164,054,599.56
1869	180,468,426.63
1870	104,538,374.44
1871	206,270,408.05
1872	216,370,280.77
1873	188,089,522.70
1874	163,103,833.69
1875	157,167,722.35
1876	148,071,984.61

Total.....\$2,274,950,074.87

Under high duties the revenue was three times what it had been under lower. We have been told in Canada again and again that this could not be—that protection cannot help but exclude goods—that if it excludes it will leave nothing to pay duty—no revenue,—that then direct taxation will be necessary. Every reader knows this to have been declared—it has been proclaimed everywhere by the papers in the importers' interest, and those who are weak enough to believe them. The above are the facts; there is no doubt about them—under protection a country imports three times as much. People will ask how this is—how excluding goods seems to bring more in. The answer is the simple truth: Protection never yet failed to make business brisk and people prosperous—they are thus enabled to buy, and they do buy a great deal more. The writer challenges any free trader to read the above undoubted figures, and put any other construction on their meaning. The reason is a very simple one, founded on a principle which seems to be innate in the human composition,—the principle that our wants increase with our riches. Many can remember that when poorer many articles, now seeming necessary to existence, had not even a place in their thoughts, so it is with protection tariffs. When properly managed, they have ever created prosperity—have given employment to the idle, money to the poor, riches to indigent communities. With riches new wants have arisen, and a thousand fresh articles are imported—in every case where it has been tried increasing the revenue—just as, by an opposite course, our Finance Minister has every successive year decreased ours.

THE MILLING AND WHEAT INTEREST.

As above shown, Canada produces—thanks to the free trade export farming system, which has, under the kind advice of foreign traders, injured much of our good wheat land, so that in many places where we got forty bushels per acre (and with proper rotation could have got it to the end of time) of good Soules wheat, our land scratching has left us in case, but to get fifteen or so of some variety not at all its equal—well, Canada produces little more than wheat enough for herself. Now, we allow free entrance to the American farmers' wheat. The result is that when there is a high price for wheat along our frontier he sends his in. Ours is often not brought to the front, as any farmer knows—it is most of it in the granaries, waiting for a fair price. When it is sent down, the Yankee wheat is pouring in also. Then ours, a harder wheat, must go to Britain, and wait four months for a return, while the U. S. man gets the cash at once. As for our getting a better price by sending it to Britain, there is no doubt whatever but that if we had our own market to ourselves, we would get a still better for it here, and our townsmen would be glad to pay, under protection, a better price—first, they would get a much better wheat for their money—next, that they would have good times and be able to raise the money. From statements of numerous millers and shippers, the writer is assured that, with regard to American wheat passing through this country to Britain, there is no difficulty in the way of placing a proper tariff on it. It is quite plain that it would come through in bond as easily as any other way—there is no extra trouble,—and if it be convenient to grind it at our few frontier mills which do something in that line, they can grind it in bond—as they once used to do. The statement made by various picnic speakers that a tariff on grain would stop our railways from carrying U. S. grain through to the seaboard, is a fabrication which I fear must have been well known to be such by the persons who used it. The result of a tariff on it would be—1. Canadians would get better and healthier bread—(if such a paltry consideration can influence modern rulers). 2. Canadian farmers would get a better, quicker, and higher market for their wheat. 3. Canadian farmers would be saved the carriage of their wheat 3,000 miles—a thing which they may be sure is not done for nothing for them. As for the milling interest, American flour should not be allowed here duty free. All that can be ground should be ground here. It is very valuable to have the bran and other similar portions left here for cattle, and besides, one-tenth of every bushel, on an average, is paid for converting it into barrelled flour. If that be done here, it is so much more labour and pay to Canadian workmen. Moreover, give our millers plenty of grinding to do, and they will put in newer and better machinery, giving the farmer better return for his grain, and enabling themselves to produce a better article of flour for export. If you talk to any inland miller now he will tell you he would like improved machinery, but so much U. S. flour comes in that the quantity to be done here does not warrant the expense. As a rule, millers

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