

"Now that anything which exists, above all that which is absolutely existent, should come from what is not, is impossible." "Nor can it come from that which is; for then it would be already, and would not come into being." "That which exists, therefore, comes not into being; it must, therefore, be ever-existing." "From similar treatment, he proves that the existent can have no ending in time." Melissus applied the results of his analysis to the question already raised by his predecessors, of the trustworthiness of "Sensation." He argues, "If there were many real existences to each of them, the same reasonings must apply, as I have already used with reference to the "One" existence. That is to say, "If earth really exist, and water, and air, and iron and gold, and fire, and things living and things dead, and black and white, and all the various things whose reality men ordinarily assume, if all these really exist, and our sight and our hearing give us facts, then each of these as really existing must be what we concluded the One existence must be; among other things, each must be unchangeable, and can never become other than it really is." "But assuming that sight and hearing and apprehension are true, we find the cold becoming hot, and the hot cold, the hard changes to soft, the soft to hard; the living thing dies, and from that which is not living, a living thing comes into being; in short, everything changes, and what now is, in no way resembles what was." It follows, therefore, that we neither see nor apprehend realities. In fact, we cannot pay the slightest regard to experience without being landed in self-contradictions. We assume that there are