

receive no spill response training and have no specialized equipment for this work, other than what is incidental to the deployment of naval vessels. On both counts, the Armed Forces response to a spill can be expected to be ineffectual, through no fault of the military, but by reason of the policy vacuum.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Even in terms of numbers, DND's resources are not unlimited. As it noted in its presentation to the Public Review Panel on Oil Spills and Tanker Safety:

It is perhaps unfortunate that when the public think of calling out the army, many think of thousands of troops capable of descending instantly onto whatever problem may need to be solved... The reality is that the troops are few, widely spread and better employed in a specialized support role than a front-line role. Should the emergency be such as to warrant the declaration of a national emergency as defined in the *Emergencies Act*, the C[anadian] F[orces] could produce some 5,000 troops only and very few could be instantaneously deployed.⁽⁶⁹⁾

The Committee does not believe that the Canadian Forces should be primarily structured, equipped or trained for non-military or "quasi-military" maritime tasks, but rather that more consideration should be given to identifying those tasks which will become more important in the future and how the military can assist in performing them. While this process will challenge the Canadian Forces, they have a long history of rising to challenges, and the Committee agrees with Major-General Cheriton that some loss to the combat edge may have to be accepted "as the price to be paid for contemporary relevance."⁽⁷⁰⁾

In terms of organization, while the Committee does not wish to pre-judge the outcome of the broad study of government maritime activity it has recommended, it wishes to state its opinion for the record. If the study should conclude that a restructuring of government maritime assets and roles is appropriate, the Committee feels that the Canadian Forces would be a logical candidate as a focus for such a process. Although its operating costs may be somewhat higher than those of other departments involved in the maritime environment, due to its need to maintain military effectiveness, its training standards are unsurpassed in Canada, as are its command and control capabilities.

While this report has concerned itself with maritime issues, these must be addressed within the broader context of Canadian defence and security policy. The Committee believes that what is also needed is a redefinition of Canada's defence priorities which takes into account the changes in East-West relations, evolving security threats in their broadest sense, and puts forward viable medium- and long-term plans to meet national and

(68) David Anderson, Report to the Premier, p. 91.

(69) Department of National Defence, Oral Presentation, p. 9-10.

(70) Proceedings, 14:10.