

Denmark and France—and France does not seem to think that it offers very much—is to skirt around the very subject that concerns you most and lies at the centre of it, and that is the condition of Germany.

I was talking the other night with Professor Smith, who is publishing a book on East Germany and is an American authority on it—regarded of course, by our student radicals as a lackey in the pay of the defense department—who argued, persuasively to me at any rate, that one of the effective things Canada could do if she got out of NATO would be to negotiate for the recognition of East Germany.

I think I would agree entirely with that, that the problem, as in many other areas, is to recognize the realities of the situation. Germany is divided; Germany has not always been united historically; and it is now again clearly, permanently and substantially divided. A realistic foreign policy surely would take account of this and in so doing might well lead other states to a similar position.

• 1235

**Mr. Lewis:** If I may interrupt you, I think that might make sense to me if it were not for Berlin. How do you solve that? Do you recognize East Germany and retain Berlin as a separate enclave inside East Germany?

**Professor McNaught:** It seems to me that one of the problems in resolving the Berlin situation, which we should never have had in the first place, is to find some kind of diplomatic leverage by which to force real bargaining on the subject. Such a leverage might well be the question of the recognition of East Germany. But I do not see how we can recognize East Germany and stay in NATO.

**Mr. Lewis:** No, we cannot do that. That is pretty obvious.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Cafik, and then Mr. Harkness.

**Mr. Cafik:** Professor McNaught, on page 3 and continuing into page 4 there are a number of comments about which I would like to speak for a moment.

On page 3 you say:

The biggest of the credibility gaps, and there are many, in our foreign-defence policies is that between our generally conceded knowledge that there is no defence in a nuclear war and our support of an alliance system founded on a dominant nuclear power.

Then you go on, and the same theme appears on the following page, where you say:

... we should revoke a policy of military alignment which is defended on the basis of a myth.

I presume the myth you are talking of is the non-defensibility of a country. Then farther on in the same paragraph you say:

... we should say plainly that there is no defence...

It seems to be quite clear that you are stating that there is no way that we can defend ourselves.

**Professor McNaught:** Against the only kind of invasion or attack that is foreseeable, yes.

**Mr. Cafik:** All right. It is one argument to say that there is no way that any nation can adequately defend itself in the event of a nuclear war, but that is surely altogether different from saying that there is nothing that a country can do to prevent the occurrence of a nuclear war?

**Professor McNaught:** Right.

**Mr. Cafik:** If a country wanted to avoid the occurrence of a nuclear war, realizing that a nuclear war is one that everyone would lose if anyone went into it—that there is no way of defending it—if a country believed that then surely it would be quite consistent with that belief for that country to feel that it could best prevent a war by military alliance and a position of strength. Would you agree with that?

**Professor McNaught:** Yes.

**Mr. Cafik:** I have the impression upon reading this paper, that you are creating a myth in the sense that saying to the Canadian people, "There is no way you can defend yourself in a nuclear war", you create the impression—or I am afraid many people get it—that there is nothing we can do; that we just have to sit back and accept it—accept this unhealthy reality.

I think quite the contrary is true and that Canada can do something. I, personally, at the moment, from anything I have heard, am inclined to feel that the best way to prevent the awful possibility of a nuclear war is to participate in alliances that would make it impossible, and certainly not worth while, for a nuclear power to begin one. What have you to say about that?

**Professor McNaught:** Let us take that last point first. The two presidents preceding the present one in the United States are both on record as saying that the gravest danger of nuclear war that we face is that of accident. So also are Mr. Wilson and Mr. Khrushchev on record. If I had the references I am sure I could find the present leaders of Russia agreeing with that position. I find it difficult not to agree with them.