

Unfortunately for this line, only one or two of those countries in which the nationalists displayed really radical militancy were equipped with Communist parties, and they showed no particular anxiety to accept the Communists, who, as in Algeria, had done little or nothing to contribute to the achievement of independence, as allies. The others were certainly not prepared to allow the formation of Communist parties which would tend to divide a national unity which was often hard-won. Accordingly, the policy changed again. The third phase, which emerged during 1963, after the outlawing of the Algerian Communist Party, was that of liquidationism - the decision that Communists should work from within to promote the economic revolution, put their countries on the "non-capitalist path", and eventually succeed to the leadership.

Here we have an evolution away from a situation in which the U.S.S.R. worked in a largely non-ideological fashion through the cultivation of direct contacts with Afro-Asian governments regardless of their internal policy. The present Soviet policy, although it was arrived at under the pressure of tactical necessity, is nevertheless based firmly on an ideological preconception -- that social evolution of a non-capitalist kind is bound to be toward the Communist pattern, that the logic of history, in short, will lead the countries of the third world one by one into the Communist camp.

I have dwelt on the ideological question because I wanted to bring out this point. Ideological presuppositions determine policy choices both in Communist countries and the West. The main difference is that our ideology - or ideologies - are a good deal less constricting in the choices they permit us to perceive, or to make when we do perceive them. Bound by their "scientific" world views, the Communists, whether Soviet or Chinese in orientation, are united in the view that non-alignment is an historical dead end. The U.S.S.R. holds that it is a way-station on the road from colonialism to Communism. The Chinese reject it out of hand as impossible. In practice this does not prevent them from welcoming the rejection of Western alignment which it entails, but they do so faute de mieux. The difference between the two is an aspect of their different approaches to the question of peaceful coexistence.

Any discussion of relations between the Communist states and the West hinges on the meaning of peaceful coexistence, as this series of lectures has amply demonstrated. The Soviet Union is fond of saying that its policy has always been one of peaceful coexistence, ever since the days of Lenin. I want now to explore what sort of relation the Soviet Union and its allies, now they can no longer be properly called satellites, believe themselves to be conducting with us.

In the first place, we can probably take Soviet assurances at face value -- in peaceful coexistence, war between states is to be avoided. Other forms of war, namely national-liberation war, are not and, in fact, form an integral part of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The reasoning behind this is that the power of the Soviet Union and its allies is now such as to deter any attack by the "imperialists" on them. The existence of this power, it is claimed, both encourages revolutionary forces elsewhere to struggle for their freedom and inhibits the deployment of the full strength of "imperialism" against them. The support of the Communist camp will ensure the success of that struggle and the magnetism of its economic success will draw the liberated peoples inevitably into the Communist orbit.