

agreement to a greater role for Congress in approving American participation in PKOs and in shaping American policy within the Security Council - not necessarily a good thing for the UN in the long run.

Money matters greatly. When Member States fail to meet their financial obligations, it is impossible to reimburse troop-contributing countries for their participation in PKOs. Late **reimbursement**, in turn, will lead some troop contributors, particularly developing countries, to no longer offer personnel. The severity of the UN's financial crisis led to a freeze for much of 1995 of all reimbursement: over \$1 billion is owed to troop contributors.

In these circumstances, the Security Council needs seriously to reconsider the UN's capacity to launch **large and costly operations**. Recent UN deployments to Haiti, Angola, Eastern Slavonia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Georgia and Liberia have, partly for this reason, been smaller than those to Cambodia, Somalia, and Bosnia. This response does not, however, change the fact that ambitious Council mandates require large troop deployments. Nor does it change the consequences of the failure to deploy adequately: it is widely thought that the UN's effort in 1992 to reconcile the Angola government and its UNITA opponents through elections failed largely because the international presence was inadequate credibly to certify the outcome of the elections.²¹

The dramatic growth in the number and scope of UN operations has been hard for the institution to digest. A number of time-honoured **guidelines for effective peacekeeping** - such as non-participation by countries with a perceived bias towards the conflict or by immediate neighbours - had to be dropped by the Secretariat in 1993-94 as a matter of expediency (without much, if any, consideration of the consequences by the Security Council).²²

The UN's **machinery** for managing a limited number of smallish traditional PKOs was not up to the challenge of simultaneously providing effective guidance to a variety of field commanders responsible for several large and complex PKOs. This is no surprise. It is a tribute to the professionalism of the UN HQ peacekeeping staff that the organization has managed as well as it has. Nevertheless, a

²¹ The UN learned lessons from its experience in Angola: it blanketed Mozambique with approximately 2,500 observers for the October 27-28, 1994 elections, roughly five times the number deployed throughout Angola in 1992. UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello was determined to paint Mozambique blue for this event, a tactic which worked well.

²² The most glaring example of this new trend identified by UN professionals in interviews was the Secretary General's 1993 decision to accept Turkey's offer of large-scale participation in UNPROFOR, in spite of its perceived strong pro-Bosnian Government and anti-Serb bias. In fairness to the Secretary General, the expansion by the Security Council of UNPROFOR's mandate to include the monitoring of safe areas, and the insufficient numbers of troops subsequently offered by other Member States made it difficult for him to turn down offers such as Turkey's, all the more so as several of the Permanent Five, also widely perceived to have exhibited some bias, were already participating in the force.