

27. These considerations suggest the utility of an incremental approach to verification -- ie. an approach which starts off with generally acceptable confidence-building measures and evolves over time (and in ways agreeable to the international community) into a more comprehensive and effective regime. It bears repeating that there need be no fixed end-point to this process; the regime can evolve as circumstances require and permit.

28. A crucially important element of this approach is "confidence building". Confidence building should be thought of as,

...a process that, by its very nature, can help change, in a positive direction, the way participants think about important issues associated with a negotiation, its resulting agreement, and its subject matter.... Thus, confidence building not only can lead to the production of useful information relevant to an international undertaking -- including its verification -- but it can help to develop constructive new ideas about how to make those undertakings more effective by encouraging the development of shared ideas, approaches, and norms.<sup>2</sup>

29. In the CCW context, in addition to helping to provide information to support verification, confidence building can help to transform ideas and beliefs about the "risks" posed by intrusive compliance monitoring measures, whether these are understood in terms of challenges to sovereignty or risks of abuse. Over time, states would be assured that verification measures do not unduly compromise sovereignty and/or security, and that -- as part of a comprehensive regime -- they can actually provide net benefits.

30. An incremental approach would involve two tracks: one dealing with international armed conflict, and the other dealing with non-international armed conflict. With respect to the former, verification would initially involve minimally-intrusive verification measures. In the context of the latter, the emphasis would be initially on confidence-building. At set intervals, and as circumstances required and permitted, the parties to the Convention could decide to enhance CCW verification in both contexts. Over time, the two tracks could be expected to converge.

31. Movement toward a more comprehensive verification regime might also be facilitated by progressive exchanges of technical information and material assistance, coordinated through the use of confidence building measures, that would help States parties to comply with the restrictions/requirements of Protocol II. Indeed, the provision of assistance to help repair/prevent damage caused by non-compliance would seem to be dependent on there being in place a credible process to determine whether a violation had in fact occurred.

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<sup>2</sup>Jim Macintosh, *The Role of Confidence Building in the Convention on Conventional Weapons*, a report prepared for the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1994, p.5.