question of how to use such influence as we have is an underlying theme of this report. Moreover, there are issues in which we have a preponderant interest, such as the degradation of the environment and the future of the Arctic, where we have no choice but to lead the way.

In superpower arms control, the Government has played its part within the Alliance in encouraging the United States to pursue deep reductions in strategic weapons while staying within the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This policy will become even more important in 1988 as the prospects for deep reductions come to depend on a resolution of the dispute about permissible research and the development of strategic defences. Furthermore, Canada will continue to face, perhaps more acutely, the implications of its particular involvement with strategic cruise missiles. How to find a balance between co-operating with the United States in the defence of North America against the cruise missile threat, while seeking to encourage limits on cruise missile deployments by both superpowers, is a task which the Government has not fully addressed: in 1988 Canadians must hope to have a clearer accounting of the problem, and of the Canadian approach.

In other areas of arms control, such as chemical weapons and conventional force reductions, we are well placed to take maximum advantage of the breakthroughs achieved in the INF Treaty. The stringent requirements for verification agreed to in the Treaty more than justify the emphasis which Canada has placed on verification research in the past. Opportunities now exist to take advantage of the Soviet promises of a more flexible stance, and to renew initiatives for multilateral verification procedures in chemical weapons, in nuclear test ban negotiations, and in European force reductions.