

The pattern of military manoeuvres appears to be quite stable. In only two instances did the size of the manoeuvre exceed 70,000 men. NATO has invited observers to 19 out of 22 major exercises ..., the Warsaw Pact to 8 out of 17 major exercises ... . The deterioration in international relations has been reflected in the fact that Eastern states have not invited Western observers since 1979.

Western and neutral and non-aligned states have invited observers from all CSCE states or from a cross-section in each instance. During the first years the Eastern states tended to invite only neighbouring countries, but subsequently expanded their invitations. ...

Western states and neutral and non-aligned states have chosen to announce manoeuvres below the threshold of 25,000 men. ... No states have been accused of failing to notify a major military manoeuvre. However, the Soviet Union apparently failed to supply the agreed information when notifying the exercise *Zapad-81*, ... . No state has notified independent naval or air force exercises.<sup>10</sup>

This is a record that reflects fairly strict adherence to the letter but seldom the full spirit of the Helsinki CBMs. The limitations associated with the non-binding character of the measures and their very modest scope suggest two ways in which the use of CBMs can be improved in light of past experience. One is to shift their nature from voluntary to diplomatically binding (in the form of a treaty, for instance) and the other is to expand the scope of coverage. The process initiated by the original CSCE negotiations has moved, if haltingly, in this direction.

### *The Belgrade Follow-up Conference*

The Helsinki Final Act contained within it the commitment to convene meetings during which the participants would conduct a "thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference." The first such meeting was held at Belgrade in 1977.

The main topic at Belgrade was human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although the basic division was obviously between the Western and Eastern states, modest cleavages developed and grew within the Western group of states as well. The NATO states came to Belgrade intending to review the implementation of the complete Helsinki Final Act (but particularly in the area of human rights) while the Soviets and their allies wished only for a speedy conclusion that would spare them excessive abuse on human rights issues. The neutral and non-aligned (NNA) states counselled moderation and advanced proposals of their own special interest. Despite the efforts of the Soviet Union and at least three of its allies (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany), a detailed review of the Helsinki Final Act's implementation took place. As expected, it was very critical of Soviet and East European failures to implement the Final Act. The Soviet Union listened to the criticisms but generally did not respond directly, preferring to expedite the review.

In the area of Confidence-Building Measures, the review concluded that the original Helsinki CBMs had been implemented correctly, if only to the letter of the agreement. There were lengthy discussions addressing the degree to which various states had implemented the so-called "permissive" or voluntary CBMs. Western as well as neutral and non-aligned states complained about the marginal performance of the Soviet Union and the WTO states in this respect. The information supplied about notified manoeuvres was sketchy, the

<sup>10</sup> Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, p. 7. The Holst article contains a thorough listing of East, West and NNA manoeuvres.

