

sworn into the Confederate service as twelve months enlisted men, and marched within a few hours notice to the seat of war, perhaps, in the case of the Gulf States, a thousand miles away from home. When the war assumed the dimensions we all know, and when after the battle of Bull Run, the Confederate Congress decided to raise at once 400 regiments instead of the 50 or 60 it had then under arms, these young men had already seen some six months pretty hard service, and they for the most part officered the new levies, their places in the ranks being taken by new recruits who thought it a great privilege to fill them.

I dwell upon this illustration because, while it exhibits the inevitable failure of a militia system which is inappropriate to the habits of a country, it seems to me to disprove the objection so often made against "mere militia" on account of supposed insufficient training. The Confederate troops to whom I have referred were in every sense of the word a "mere militia," but they were a voluntary one, at least in their original formation. I am satisfied from personal observation that a very few weeks will do wonders to make a man, who has his heart in the work, a soldier. and I greatly doubt whether the soldier once formed, is afterwards much improved by the routine of barracks and garrison duty. I have seen a few practised men suffice to make a whole company or even a battalion "smart" and efficient in some of the most difficult things that the "Regular" has to be taught such as promptness in pitching or striking tents, rapid shifting of quarters, night marches, and outpost duty. As for making the best of adverse or unexpected circumstances, in other words the art of taking care of himself, I feel sure that his ordinary civilian habits will almost always give the man who is only occasionally a soldier a marked superiority over the veteran trooper. I mean of course that the occasional soldier should not be part of a mere rabble, but be animated by that spirit, which, rather than drill makes a man reliable under fire. This is where, in my opinion, the Prussians had so much the advantage over the French.

In further confirmation of my view that it is not so much prolonged training that makes troops most effective, I may point to the fact that the most momentous struggles in history have generally been fought out with more or less raw troops. It is in the nature of things that the ready food for powder is first used up, and must be replaced, whether by conscription or enlistment, with recruits to whom there is no time to give the martinet polish of peaceful times. I believe I am right in saying that during the Peninsular campaign many regiments joined the future "Iron Duke" which had barely had a few weeks' drill before embarkation.

What then, I mean to say, with all due deference to more experienced opinions than mine, is that the Swiss military system is neither good because it is a militia system nor, on the other hand, is it bad because of that reason. It is singularly well adapted to Swiss circumstances and habits; it is not adapted in its present form to English circumstances and habits; but it contains principles and features which may be studied with profit and applied here. Among these I may mention the encouragement of boy Volunteers in the public schools and a greater development and elaboration of the local organization of the grown up Volunteers.

I see in the interest which has of late been bestowed upon the Swiss military institutions, the indication of a very decided progress in civilization. It is the tendency

of relying more upon the "reserve forces" than upon the huge "standing Army" and this implies short terms of service, suitable provision for the discharged soldier; in other words, his return to civil life, instead of forming a class or caste apart. It is the tendency also to do away with conscription, which to me, is the most objectionable of all forms of military service, and which, instead of making that service a training school as it ought to be, makes it a cause of national demoralization. Let us hope, also, that this tendency to a more popular form of military organization implies preparation for defence rather than attack, and thus point to the diminution of the causes of war.

But until the millennium of the Peace Society shall actually have dawned, I do not expect, nor would I wish to see standing armies altogether abolished. Great States, whether their colonies are in the four quarters of the globe, as those of Great Britain, or whether their expansion is confined to an internal self-development, as in the United States of America, require a force however small of professional soldiers. I go further and say, that independently of the peculiar circumstances of either Great Britain or America, no State which has great centres of population, can safely dispense with such a force. It need not be so large as to endanger public liberty, but it must be thoroughly efficient for maintaining public order, and it ought to afford a standard and a model to that Militia to which the State may then safely entrust the duty of national self defence.

GERMANY AND HER NEIGHBORS.

The German Empire is surrounded by three great neighbors, one of which is unconditionally hostile to it and eager for revenge; while the other two may be either good or bad neighbors, and it may, therefore, be said that they are not to be depended upon. Though it is problematical whether France will ever in the future attack us as she did last year, this much is certain, that she would eagerly advance to the attack if we were involved in a war with another great power, or even if she had any hope or prospect of foreign assistance against Germany. France may therefore be regarded as a ready and willing ally of any Power that wants to fight with Germany; no calculation or cool deliberation will ever restrain this her greatest passion. Last year she half counted upon the assistance of Austria; and there persons were not wanting who were inclined to answer her expectations. For Count Beust was a vigorous French partisan till November; but Russia would not have suffered the entrance of Austria into French service, with out undertaking something equivalent, and taking care to maintain the balance between West and East. In presence of this impending threat, the game was too dangerous for Austria, and the stake was not risked. Is it conceivable that a man or a party in Vienna will ever again give the advice to take the field with France against Germany? There is not a total want of reasons or pretences for such a course; several of them are easily to be discovered. It may be represented to the Hapsbourgs that Germany is exercising a too strong attractive power on their German subjects; and that it would, therefore, be well to take part in a French war for the purpose of weakening Germany. Or a party in Vienna may advise the Emperor to go to war in order to strengthen his power as a ruler in his Empire, after Napoleon's unlucky example; and the party there, which has certainly been hitherto hostile to Germany. With respect to such counsels, however, the

necessity of considering Russia's attitude would always be felt in Vienna. If Russia were to take advantage of the opportunity to advance on the Danube, the Hapsbourgs would have so much to do at home that they could hardly spare the time, even so much as to look about them in the German Empire.

While Austria is thus far from free, and can easily be restrained in her movements against Germany, it is otherwise with Russia. With her we have of late got on far better than with Austria, and for the present nothing divides us. But it is not on that account less than in Russia a powerful tendency, which is aiming at complete union, forms a determined opposition to all that belongs to Western Europe, and no less so to all that is German. This one-sided national tendency has not been removed or deprived of its sharpness by the well-intentioned innovations of the Emperor Alexander, which have gained so much applause in Europe. It not only continues to exist, but it even derives nourishment from those changes in the condition of society. One day, perhaps, we shall not be able to agree so well with it as with the more moderate policy of the present Government. That un compromising national tendency is striving to make its way in all directions. It is possible that it may first seek extension in Asia and in the south-eastern part of our Continent, and be satisfied with that; but it is also possible that it may soon direct its glances and longings to countries which more closely concern us. In the latter event, nothing would suit it better than the idea of an alliance with France against Germany. Therefore, we must create an armed force, not only capable of defending us against France, but also strong enough to put out of the head of that Russian party the thought of such an alliance with France. The task does not exceed our strength, now that Germany's western frontier has become so much stronger; but our ability to fight, at the same time, with two great Powers may have the happy result of producing the conviction in Russia that it is more advantageous to be the friend than the foe of Germany. If we are in a position to carry on war on two stages at the same time, our judgment on all possible undertakings of Russia will be important and worthy of consideration for her Government. And we may thereby prevent France from ever finding support in St. Petersburg against Germany—support for which Napoleon III. sued in vain. But from what we have already said, it follows, as a matter of course, that if our power and capacity for fighting procure us good relations with Russia we shall be all the more sure of Austria; for by an understanding with Russia we could always render it impossible for Austria to fight on the side of France: and Austria, if she were in such a position that she never could fight with us, would find it most convenient to be on good terms with us. In a word we have the great neighbours; it is not enough for us to be in a position to fight with one of them. No; we must be able to fight two of them, if we want to maintain and preserve what belongs to us.—*National Zeitung.*

The *Kriegspiel*, a game of war used in the German military schools and said to be a favorite pastime with Von Moltke, Prince Frederick Charles and other Prussian leaders, has been introduced into England, General Eyre having presented one to the War office. We presume this German affair is not very different from the excellent game invented a few years since by Major Richardson, a Confederate officer, which, however, was too costly for general use.