

tion of character is attained, which consists in the ability to act according to definite maxims. It is not expected, however, that this shall be the character of an adult, but of a child.

There are three things necessary to the formation of character: 1. Obedience, which must be absolute and unquestioning. The child must learn to obey authority in school in order to learn to respect law as a citizen, even if the law does not meet with his approval. 2. Truthfulness, without which there can be no such thing as character. Kant says with greatest emphasis: "The truth must under no circumstance be forced from children by means of punishment." They must be taught to love the truth and

not to be moved by fear. 3. Lastly, the philosopher mentions cheerfulness and sociableness as essential to character. For it is the gladsome alone that is capable of pleasure in the good things of life.

6. Unlike Rousseau, Kant taught that the child must early be taught about God, though he would not teach him doctrine; in a word the child should be taught religion, but not theology. Morality should precede religion, but should not be divorced from it.

These are some of the important teachings of Kant in pedagogics. He believed that education is an art, a profession, and the problem of education is the greatest that can be given to man.—*The Teacher*.

THEORY OF TEACHING—HOW DOES THE CONCEPT ARISE FROM THE PERCEPT?

DR. J. MARK BALDWIN, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

IN answering this question, I shall be plain at the risk of being commonplace. It is only partially true that the concept arises from the percept at all. It is rather true that the two arise together, by the same mental movement. Going back to that neglected period, infancy, we may ask as a matter of fact, what takes place.

Suppose a single presentation, A, in the infant consciousness; then suppose it removed. The child is now ready to germinate in two different ways, forward and backward, futureward and pastward. He remembers and he expects. Viewed as memory, his experience, A, is particular, a sensation, a percept; viewed as expectation, it is general, a concept. For viewed as expectation, it is the whole of the child's reality; it is what will happen, for it is all that can happen:

he knows nothing else. Whatever then actually does happen is at first A, and remains A if it is possible for the child's consciousness to keep it A. This fact that past experience, taken as representing future experience, is general, I may call the general (concept) of the first degree. It means that at this stage particular experiences are the measure of all things, of things generally.

But as particulars increase, they limit one another, both in memory and in expectation. Instead of A (red colour) happening, B (green colour) happens; and instead of all my reds being red squares, and all my greens, green squares, I have red circles and green circles, red and green triangles, fantastic shapes of red and green, etc. This means two