


WHAT'S WHAT *the* WORLD OVER

Described and Discussed by Contemporary Thinkers



ENGLAND AND JAPAN

Does the Future of the Alliance Depend Upon Russia

NOTHING at this moment furnishes so much food for speculation as the new alignment of the powers likely to follow in the wake of Armageddon. This is the opening observation of K. K. Kawakami, the Japanese journalist, writing on "England and Japan" in the Atlantic Monthly.

In the present world-war, as during the preceding decade, the Anglo-Japanese alliance has proved to be of mutual advantage to the high contracting parties. Will it survive the great upheaval which is shaking Europe from its foundation? With Kiauchow restored to Chinese sovereignty, and with Russia becoming more and more friendly toward Japan, has the *raison d'être* of the Anglo-Japanese alliance virtually ceased to exist? In a word, what will be the future of the alliance?

That its future depends largely upon Russia's attitude after the war seems inevitable. If, at the peace conference that is to follow the war, Russia is given what she has been coveting, she will continue to be friendly with Great Britain and will keep Germany at arm's length. In that case there is no reason why Japan should not renew the alliance with England, though perhaps in more or less modified form. She has already entered into an entente cordiale with Russia. By renewing the alliance with England, she will become a party to a triangular combination and thus secure herself against the not improbable revenge of Germany. England, too, will be anxious to participate in such

foregone conclusion that Japan will avoid, if she can possibly do so, another disastrous war with Russia, knowing that her resources are too limited to cope with Russia's tremendous potential power. Japan's present relationship with Russia is one of entente cordiale, and not one of alliance; for the recently concluded convention provides no mutual obligations of the high contracting parties to extend armed assistance to each other. On the contrary, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, in its present form, obliges either high contracting party to render armed assistance to the other in case either is involved in war, defending its territorial or special interests mentioned in the treaty. Should Russia and England cease to be friends as the result of the peace conference and eventually become involved in war, into which Germany might easily be drawn as Russia's ally, England, on the strength of the present alliance, would oblige Japan to open hostilities against Russia and Germany. The instinct of self-preservation must impel Japan to avoid such a disastrous course.

It is not unthinkable that Downing Street views with some little uneasiness the growing friendship between Tokio and Petrograd. It is rumoured that soon after the fall of Tsingtau Marquis Yamagata, dean of the elder statesmen of Japan, expressed himself in favour of entering into an alliance with Russia. His idea in urging such an alliance was, of course, to prepare against Germany's possible revenge. He entertained no thought of superseding the Anglo-Japanese alliance by an alliance with Russia. In official circles, however, it was feared that Great Britain would by no means be pleased if Japan were to take steps toward the conclusion of an alliance with Russia. This was undoubtedly the circumstance which caused much delay in the consummation of the new convention with Russia, which was to have been signed almost a year before Count (now Marquis) Okuma, in a statement for the press, made it plain that the delay was due to the negotiation which had to be conducted with the British Government.

There is no room to doubt that Japan has been fastidiously considerate of the susceptibilities of the British Government—so much so, indeed, that a Tokio newspaper sarcastically inquires if Japan's foreign department is in Downing Street. Yet the alliance terminates in 1921. Will it be renewed, or will the two powers have come to the parting of the ways? The key is in Russia's hands. It does not take a prophet to foresee that Russia's attitude and disposition will be the determining factor in the realignment of the powers in the Far East.

Much has of late been said of Japanese discontent with the alliance with England. But the public has forgotten that before Japan began to complain of England's "selfishness" many British newspapers and publicists had long been assailing Japan. As early as 1908 such men as Lord Stanhope and F. B. Vrooman, and many others, openly attacked Japanese ambitions, and urged the readjustment of England's Far-Eastern policy. The same sentiment has been voiced in not a few English newspapers. At that time Japanese publicists and press made no reply to such expressions of unfriendliness. Japan's whole attention was turned to the recuperation of her energy and to the readjustment of her position in Manchuria. As she gradually recovered from the shock of the Russian war, however, she began to cast about and found that England's attitude towards her had been far from cordial.

But it was not until after the fall of Tsingtau that a few Japanese newspapers and publicists openly attacked the British policy in the Far East. The reader will recall that when Japan decided to enter into the war England dispatched a cruiser and a

contingent of troops to participate in the siege of Tsingtau, the German stronghold in Kiauchow. Officially Japan extended to them a cordial hand of welcome, but at heart she felt that England was intruding in a field where her assistance was not needed. The Japanese felt that their western ally must either be distrustful of them or entertain motives other than those of expediting the reduction



THE REBELLIOUS PUPIL.

Teacher: "Maybe you'll feel more like playing when I'm through with you."

—The New York Times Magazine, March 11, 1917.

of Tsingtau. No public comment was made to that effect, but the feeling was in the air.

Upon the fall of Tsingtau one or two newspapers in Tokio came out with the assertion that England, on the strength of the part she had played in the capture of Tsingtau, coveted the northern half of the Tientsin-Pukow line controlled by Germany. It was also rumoured that she was averse to the extension of Japanese influence in Shantung, formerly Germany's sphere of influence. How true these statements were only those within the inner official circles at London and Tokio can tell. The fact remains that they did no small injury to the cordial relations between the two nations.

In the celebrated Japanese demands presented to China in January, 1915, Japan expressed the "wish" that China would grant her the privilege of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, in which considerable Japanese capital had been invested, as well as the railways between Nanchang and Hangchow and between Nanchang and Chaochow, provided that Great Britain would not object to the concession. These cities are in the Yangtse Valley, which England has long since staked out as her own sphere of influence. Whether England checkmated Japan's scheme to secure the above-named railway concessions is not known, but the significant fact was that the British press severely criticized that particular phase of the Japanese demands. At any rate, Japan failed to get the concessions.

Most Britishers in China are anti-Japanese. They



"WE'RE READY TO TESTIFY, TOO."

—Kirby, in New York World.

a combination, for she knows that she will have to bear the brunt of Germany's bitterest enmity for many years after the war.

If, on the other hand, Russia is dissatisfied with the outcome of the peace parley, and shows herself inclined to be reconciled with Germany, Japan will of necessity hesitate to continue the alliance with England on the same basis as hitherto; for it is a