

government department, which, greedy of power, and covetous of patronage, regards the colonies as a sphere for the exercise of the legislative fancies of a colonial minister, and the appointments of the colonial government as a provision for such members of the aristocracy as are too ignorant or too idle to obtain promotion at home.

True it is that these facts may be disgraceful to the Colonial-office; and that imperial may be *in theory* compatible with colonial rights: but this is not enough. The proposer of a new scheme of colonial government is certainly bound to describe the framework of the constitution he proposes, and to explain the mode of its operation, as illustrated by practical examples. It appears, therefore, that two abstract questions must be determined—first, what are the rights of a colonist? and secondly, assuming that Great Britain and the Colonies ought to form one United Empire, what rights of supremacy must be reserved to Great Britain to maintain that union? or, in other words, what are imperial rights?

Having determined these two questions, the greater difficulty remains of adjusting these two classes of rights on a certain basis, by means of a written constitution, and protecting such constitution from being invaded by the ignorance, or petulance, of the colonies. The first of the above propositions need not detain us now. A distinct principle has been shown to be laid down in the English law for our guidance in ascertaining the rights of the colonist; and it will be more convenient to postpone the consideration of them till we have determined the nature of the powers to which they are to be subordinate. By treating the subject in this order, I hope to show that after vesting in Great Britain all powers that are necessary to maintain her as the supreme