

safety. Fortunately, Great Britain has possessions most favourably situated for establishing these necessary depôts and dockyards in the maritime provinces of North America, in Bermuda, and in the West Indies.

The fall of New Orleans, and more lately that of Fort Fisher, has clearly shown, that in presence of the means of attack which in the course of four years of war have been developed in America, works for the defence of these dockyards must be of the most substantial character and of large extent, and that they must be defended by numerous garrisons, probably not much less than 15,000 men for each.

Without these fortified bases of operations for the navy off the coast of North America, a blockade would, on account of its great length—3,000 miles—and distance from England, be almost impossible, (even with them it would be most difficult,) and American ships of war and Alabamas would swarm; so that the operation of maintaining supplies and reinforcing an army in Canada, even when the navigation was not closed by the rigour of the climate, would be attended with great risk and vast losses, not to speak of the direct effect upon the general commerce of the country, and the indirect effect produced among the manufacturing population by the great diminution of our export trade.

It is a primary condition, therefore, to the maintenance of an army in Canada, that these fortified