tory at the time to all the provinces. Availing themselves of the experience of the United States, they adopted at the outset a principle with respect to the balance of power the very reverse of that which obtains in the constitution of that country. In the Canadian constitution, the powers of the provincial governments are distinctly specified, while those of the general government cover the whole ground of legislation not so expressly reserved to the provincial authorities. The Dominion government is authorized in express terms "to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not coming within the classes by this Act [the Act of Union] assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces;" and in addition to this general provision it is enacted that "any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in this section [that is, the section defining the powers of the general parliament] shall not be deemed to come within the class of matters of a local or private nature comprised in the enumeration of the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces."

The object of the foregoing provision can be clearly understood from the language of the astute Premier of Canada, Sir John Macdonald, when he explained the details of confederation to the legislature. "We have thus avoided," he said, "that great source of weakness which has been the cause of the disruption of the United States; we have avoided all conflict of jurisdiction and authority." After an experience of thirty years, it must be acknowledged that the constitution has worked exceedingly well as a rule, but at the same time it is evident that the hopes of the Canadian Premier were somewhat too sanguine. In fact, it is obviously impossible, under a written constitution defining the respective powers of separate political authorities, to prevent questions of doubt arising as to where really rests the right of legislation in certain matters. The numerous cases that have already come before the courts of Canada and the Privy Council of England show how difficult it is by mere words to fix the legislative limits of the central and provincial governments. It already takes several volumes to comprise all the reports and pamphlets that have appeared up to this time on this troublesome question of jurisdiction.

Questions relating to education and separate schools — the Manitoba school difficulty, for instance — and to the religious and social interests of the two nationalities that possess Canada, necessarily crop up from time to time, but so far they have been generally settled by the judgments of the courts, to which great respect is paid as in all countries of British institutions, and by principles of compromise and conciliation on which a federal system must be more or less based.

The constitution of Canada provides a means of arriving at a solu-