

harp on the old string, but get no response from the popular heart, nor even from political parties. Great Britain has found that she still has to fight for her own hand, commercially and politically, and cannot afford to despise her natural allies. The vigor of colonial life, the expansion of colonial trade and power, the greatness of the part which the colonies are manifestly destined to take in affairs, have impressed even the slow British imagination. The integrity of the empire is fast becoming an essential article in the creed of all political parties. The idea appeals to the instincts of Great Britain's new democracy even more strongly than to the pride of her aristocracy, and with better reason, for the vast unoccupied areas of the empire in the colonies offer to the workingman a field of hope when the pressure at home has become too severe. Statesmen of the first rank, such as Earl Rosebery and the late W. E. Forster, have grasped the idea that national consolidation should form the supreme object of national policy, and have done what they could to develop the public sentiment which alone can make it such. The range of the national vision is widening; there is a tendency to look beyond the old ruts of European diplomacy to the nobler work and larger destiny opened up in the Greater Britain beyond the sea.

To the development of this wider view the growth of the United States has contributed largely. It has illustrated on a large scale the expansive energy of our race where the conditions are favorable. It has enlarged our conception of Anglo-Saxon self-governing capacity. It has shown that an unparalleled impulse to a nation's life may be given by vast breadth of territory with variety of climate and production. On the other hand, the British people see in the American Union proof that immense territorial extent is not incompatible, under modern conditions, with that representative system of popular government which had its birth and development in England and its most notable adaptation in America. They are beginning to believe that their political system will safely bear the strain of still further adaptation to wider areas, if the welfare or necessities of the empire demand a change. That they will demand it is a proposition now become so evident that it scarcely requires proof. The home population of Great Britain, which alone exercises national functions in their broadest sense, and bears the full burden of national responsibilities, is about thirty-five millions. This number has practically reached its outside limit of expansion. The Anglo-Saxon population of the empire abroad is already about eleven millions, and is increasing rapidly. It is a population which has already grouped itself into communities of national extent, self-governing, self-reliant, progressive, and with a clear sense of the large place which they are destined to fill in the world. The time cannot be very far distant when, by the flux of population and the process of growth, their numbers will equal or surpass those of the people of the British Isles. There can be no question that long before that period has arrived a readjustment of functions and responsibilities will be essential to the maintenance of the empire as a political unit. The British people at home cannot continue to bear alone the increasing burden of imperial duties. Great communities like Australia or Canada would disgrace the traditions of the race if they remained permanently content with anything short of an