ment and technology to other countries only on the basis of binding commitments that Canadian supplies will not serve the development of any nuclear-explosive device for whatever purpose. This policy will apply equally to all countries. Canada is determined that its nuclear assistance must not contribute to the manufacture of nuclear-explosive devices.

The promotion of an effective international safeguards system is a prerequisite to a greater exchange of nuclear technology and materials, including exchanges between advanced and developing countries. Thus, both exporters and importers of nuclear technology and materials, whether or not parties to the treaty, have a strong interest in the application of effective safeguards by the IAEA. An exporter of nuclear materials and technology such as Canada is anxious to promote international commerce and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but only with assurance that such co-operation will be fully compatible with international security. The most satisfactory way for states to give that assurance to the international community is by participating in this treaty and by accepting its safeguards provisions.

As more and more non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty develop nuclear-energy capacities, the more important will be the role of IAEA safeguards applied in these states. These safeguards serve as a reassurance to neighbours and co-operating states alike that nuclear energy is not being diverted to the manufacture of nuclear-explosive devices.

Perhaps the most successful aspect of the treaty has been the IAEA's verification of the safeguards commitments of the non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty. Canada was the first country with a large nuclear industry to accept NPT safeguards inspection of all its nuclear facilities. Any initial uneasiness we may have had about their possible intrusiveness or economic burden has disappeared. There is no evidence that their application has in any appreciable way hindered the development of nuclear technology or the operation of nuclear power facilities within Canada. Nor have they proved in any way incompatible with Canadian sovereignty.

It is important that the depositary powers also place their civil nuclear facilities under international safeguards as a demonstration of their support for the purposes of this treaty. The United States and the United Kingdom have already made offers to place their peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and are negotiating agreements to this end. We welcome their willingness to do so. We urge the Soviet Union to take the same step. We hope that the acceptance of safeguards on their civil facilities by the depositary