

to be subject to government control. Since the constitutional authority for international bridges is vested in the federal government, it is clearly desirable that this level of government should control, or at least be answerable for the activities of the authority, and this responsibility could not be easily exercised over a joint authority. Moreover, the creation of any joint federal/provincial body is likely to be complicated by constitutional issues, and any solution which would avoid this seems desirable.

A pertinent question is whether the ends sought by Ontario require the creation of a joint authority. In effect, everything sought by Ontario could be achieved through a purely Federal authority, with an appropriate mechanism for introducing provincial participation. This could be done quite simply by establishing the principle that a significant percentage of the members of the authority should be nominated by the provincial government so that the provincial point of view would be adequately expressed. The members of the authority could be appointed by the Governor in Council so that the federal nature of the body would remain unimpaired. Considerable powers could then be delegated to the authority since there would be no question of the federal powers being relinquished to the province. International agreements could be handled, or at least monitored by the Department of External Affairs and political responsibility for major decisions would remain with the Federal Government at all times.

It is difficult to see what objections Ontario could have to such an arrangement, since it would ensure provincial input into international bridge matters and facilitate cooperation with provincial planners. Above all, it would create what is now lacking, namely a body capable of initiating action in the international bridge field and of conducting the financial affairs of international bridges without any charges falling on either level of government.