

For synthesis and analysis of the data obtained in the course of multilateral verification, much depends on the organization of the regime. If decisions concerning charges of non-compliance are left to individual parties there could still be synergy in the sharing of data and in cooperation in analysis, especially among allies. Collecting, correlating, and storing the data in readily accessible form will require competent staff with modern data processing equipment, and it would be extremely inefficient to have this task repeated by all of the parties to a multilateral treaty. Nevertheless the desire to retain an expert national intelligence operation is likely to limit the extent to which countries will be prepared to pool their resources.

If a central multinational agency were to be formed for the collection and analysis of data, there would be a maximum opportunity for synergy, albeit accompanied by some danger of internal conflict and obstruction. In the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA has functioned without serious contention, but there is some doubt as to its ability to detect steps towards nuclear proliferation on the part of nations wishing to conceal such activity.

In the case of verification in a starkly adversarial situation (such as the post-war Persian Gulf) between a multinational coalition and an uncooperative opponent, it would be desirable to have a central organization for collection and analysis, and legitimate to expect considerable synergy, but it could be necessary to exclude the adversary from the central organization.

For the verification of an agreement among willing participants, each prepared to fulfil his undertakings, synergy should aid in the establishment and maintenance of confidence. But the arrangements should be designed to continue to function effectively when one or more of the

signatories comes under justifiable suspicion, and to be able to discover violations (if they really occur) as well as to confirm compliance (if it is in fact being observed). The ship should be built to survive storms as well as to sail hand-somely in the best of weather.

Among Implementing Bodies and in the United Nations

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Most arms control agreements call for the establishment of an implementing body whose purpose is to assure implementation of all provisions of the agreement. These functions usually include: establishing agreed procedures called for by the agreements; handling ambiguities and clear cases of non-compliance; assuring that called-for data exchanges and notifications are performed in a timely manner; and monitoring or conducting permitted on-site inspections (OSIs).

In addition to implementing bodies established by the agreements, separate national agencies are created to conduct specific activities, for example, the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, which was created to conduct the OSIs which that country is allowed by the INF, START, and CFE agreements. The United States also established a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) which has become the mechanism for transmitting data exchanges, notifications, and requests for OSIs. The former Soviet Union established one body, Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, which performs the functions of both the OSIA and the U.S. NRRC. The IAEA is the implementing body for the NPT, although its functions are restricted to assuring that nuclear materials are used only for peaceful purposes. In the case of the BTWC, the UN Security Council itself performs the functions of an implementing body.

