

from using zone ports or airfields unless assurances were given that no nuclear weapons were on board.”¹⁰⁰ Thus, he appears to have conceded that a ban on transit through international waters would not be feasible. Yet later on in his paper he refers repeatedly to the “ban on transit of nuclear weapons across the zone” necessary to create the “barrier between the two superpowers” that he considers to be “the most important function of the CADZ.”¹⁰¹ Later still, he asserts that the “rights of innocent passage for Soviet submarines traveling on the surface under transfer between the northern fleet and the Black Sea or Baltic fleets would be easy to arrange.”¹⁰² It seems difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this with the “ban on transit of nuclear weapons across the zone,” unless the “innocent passage” to which he refers is restricted to those ocean areas at the fringes of the zone and apparently not covered by it, according to the accompanying map (see figure 1), such as the waters off the coast of Norway and the UK. But what does this do to the supposedly impenetrable “barrier” that the zone is said to have created, to his claim later on that the zone would have caused the Soviet Union to lose its military access to the North Atlantic, and the United States its access to the Norwegian Sea?¹⁰³ As the latter statements suggest, Wilkes is concerned with more than simply the prevention of submarine transit through the zone. As he puts it, “flights of bombers, strategic reconnaissance aircraft, cruise missiles and maybe other air and seacraft would [also] be banned.” In fact, he goes so far as to proclaim that “in principle, ballistic missile overflights would be banned” as well!¹⁰⁴

Finally, the only mention of the transit issue in the proposals of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference — and an indirect one at that — is the draft principle of 1986 stating that “Nation-States cannot establish NWFZ’s in areas outside their jurisdiction, particularly on the high seas, international straits and in international air space.”¹⁰⁵ While

100. Wilkes, *op. cit.* note 50, p. 8.

101. *Ibid.*

102. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

105. ICC, *op. cit.* note 80, p. 15.