

Institutes, it is affirmed that, along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must have some cognisance of itself. This is made the basis of our Author's Epistemology, and it is in this proposition that his answer to the question, What is knowledge, is embodied. He fancies that by indicating the Ego as an object known in all cognition, he has set before us "the common point in which all our cognitions unite and agree." "The Ego," he says, "is this feature, point or element; it is the common centre which is at all times known, and in which all our cognitions, however diverse they may be in other respects, are known as uniting and agreeing; and besides the Ego or one's self, there is no other identical quality in our cognitions." But is it not plain that the Professor is here labouring under a delusion? To say, that, along with whatever any intelligence knows, it knows itself, is not informing us what knowledge is. Mr. Ferrier may have succeeded in pointing out an object which is apprehended in every cognitive act; but this is not tantamount to pointing out an element common to all cognition: it is not designating the many varieties of knowledge by one notion: it is saying nothing about knowledge, but only something about its object. Our author has lost himself, therefore, at the very outset of his course; and has failed to secure the basis indispensable for the structure which he proposes to erect.

The force of these strictures will be still more apparent, if, admitting Professor Ferrier's starting position, that the Ego must know itself in all cognition, and accepting this as an explanation of what knowledge is, we proceed to examine the conclusion deduced. He argues that because an intelligence must, along with whatever it cognizes, have some cognisance of itself, the object (properly so called)—the perfect object—of cognition, is not self simply, nor the thing or thought simply which in ordinary thinking is viewed as the object; but that it is self-cum-alio—self *plus* the object (popularly so called)—that, in short, it is Mind-in-union-with-Somewhat, or the synthesis of subject and object. Now is such an inference legitimate? Assuredly not. At least the conclusion cannot be deduced from the premises by a purely logical process. For what is there, as far as has yet been shewn, to hinder a person who admits that the Ego is known in all cognition, from holding that a knowledge of self may accompany a knowledge of whatever things or thoughts the mind apprehends; yet not so as that self, and the thing or thought apprehended along with it, form by their synthesis a single object of cognition, but so as that self forms one complete object of cognition, and the thing or thought apprehended along with it forms another complete object of cognition? There is no absurdity, as far as the form of