

THE CANADIAN SPECULATION.

The Canadian campaign in American speculative markets which culminated in the failure of A. E. Ames & Co., of Toronto, began some four years ago, when a coterie of Toronto capitalists bought a very large block of Twin City Rapid Transit on a basis of \$70 per share as a non-dividend stock.

It is not to be supposed that this was by any means the beginning of stock speculation in Toronto. The exchange in that city is nearly half a century old, and has always been noted for somewhat sensational dealings on its own account. Wall street remembers the remarkable campaign of George Gooderham in War Eagle Mining about five years ago, when that capitalist carried the stock up from \$10 to \$350 per share, immediately followed by a collapse to \$17.5. It was probably the collapse in this security that really gave an impetus to Canadian speculation on the American markets. The big men of Toronto saw that speculation on their own board was necessarily narrow and capable of the worst kind of manipulation and stock jobbing.

The principle upon which these speculators have worked was to buy a stock that they considered selling away below its possibilities, and to buy it very hard. When they had succeeded in placing their Twin City on a 5 per cent. dividend basis they turned their attention to Boston and acquired from Henry M. Whitney and his associates control of the Dominion Coal Co., at \$40 per share, and of the Dominion Iron & Steel Co. at \$25. The speculation that followed in these securities is still fresh in the minds of the public.

Next, to appease the appetites of the Canadians was the Detroit United and Toledo Traction securities, and so successfully were these stocks bid up that there appeared to be no limit to the advancing quotations. Massachusetts Electric securities were brought to their attention and

after having such success with other tractions—Twin City, Detroit and Toledo—they started in to acquire the common stock of this Boston owned system, but only secured about 20-25 per cent. of the stock, owing largely to their inability to secure options from the large owners upon a large block of the stock at \$40 per share. This Canadian buying, however, at the time advanced Massachusetts Electric common to \$45, and the Boston holders were so anxious to let the Canadians in that the latter became suspicious, and sold out about half of their stock at a loss of 8 to 10 points.

In the meantime the Canadians were active upon the New York stock exchange. They made fortunes in the speculation in Louisville & Nashville and Missouri Pacific, which have been among their own board for years.

When leading officials of the Twin City left St. Paul to enter the service of the Brooklyn Rapid Transit, the Toronto interests acquired a large line of Brooklyn Rapid Transit stock.

Looking around for new fields to conquer, the tremendous possibilities of the Consolidated Lake Superior Co. came to their attention, and they formed a syndicate for \$5,000,000 to acquire securities in enterprise. This investment, however, turned out to be a poor one, and the Canadians lost heavily in it.

In the interim they did not neglect their own properties, such as Crows Nest Pass, which they advanced in price 250 per cent. Sao Paulo Tramway, which stock was given as bonus with the line in subscription for \$90, was advanced to 118 within a year, and various other land, mining, traction and manufacturing enterprises.

Private wires were leased to the active Canadian brokerage houses and the prices of seats on the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges doubled and trebled in price, until they became the highest priced stock exchange seats, next to the New York stock exchange, surpassing the price of the Boston exchange seats by \$3,000 and \$1,000 each.

Here at a glance can be seen the extent of the tremendous speculation

in leading Canadian speculative factors:

	Low	High	Adv.	Ret.
Dom. Coal.....	70	75	10	75
Dom. Steel.....	22	75	37 1/2	12
Crow's N. Pass.....	25	100	25	75
Can. Pacific.....	33	140	37	117 1/2
Gen. N. Pass.....	25	75	12 1/2	25
Tol. Ry. & L. S.....	25	75	12 1/2	25
Dom. United.....	27	75	25	75
Sao Paulo.....	50	118	30	30
St. Paul.....	30	32	25	41 1/2

Toronto could not see that the bubble had burst and kept averaging on the decline, but certain Montreal interests started in to make as great profits on the down side as on the advance, especially in the case of the Dominion Coal and Steel securities.

Mr. Ames, of the recently failed banking firm of Toronto, was a director in many of Canada's leading corporations. He was president of the Metropolitan Bank of Toronto, which organized last December with \$1,000,000 capital and \$1,000,000 reserve fund; he was a director of the Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., the Twin City Rapid Transit Co., the Canada Cycle & Motor Co., a \$600,000 corporation, the Carter Crane Co., Ltd., \$2,000,000 capital, the Imperial Life Insurance Co., the W. A. Rogers Co., the Toronto Electric Light Co., and many other corporations, and was largely interested in the securities of these corporations. He was rated a millionaire many times over, and his father-in-law, Senator George A. Cox, was rated to be worth \$400,000,000.

The Ames house is said to have outstanding bank loans of considerably over \$15,000,000, and how far the failure will involve other interests it is impossible to state.—Wall Street Journal.

NARROWING WHEAT SUPPLIES.

American wheat supplies are steadily approaching the minimum, the decrease in May aggregating 17,062,000 bushels, as against a decrease of 17,480,000 bushels in May a year ago, 13,901,000 bushels in 1901 and 13,331,000 bushels in 1900. This reduction compares with a decrease of 15,400,000 bushels in April and of only 9,744,000 bushels in March. Follow-

ing are the statistics of supplies held in the United States and Canada at the first of each month for four years:

	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.
January 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
February 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
March 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
April 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
May 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
June 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
July 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
August 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
September 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
October 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
November 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001
December 1.....	90,112	91,012	90,001	90,001

There is here shown a stock on May 1, 1903, of 38,088,000 bushels, a decrease of 17,175,000 bushels since January 1 this year, as against a decrease of 61,271,000 bushels last year and of 41,810,000 bushels two years ago. The situation so far as the more statistics themselves are concerned is a rather strong one in this country and Canada, judging from the following figures of stocks held on June 1 for the past eleven years:

	East of Pacific	Rockies	Coast	Total
June 1, 1903.....	38,088,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	69,088,000
June 1, 1902.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000
June 1, 1901.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000
June 1, 1900.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000
June 1, 1899.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000
June 1, 1898.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000
June 1, 1897.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000
June 1, 1896.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000
June 1, 1895.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000
June 1, 1894.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000
June 1, 1893.....	37,000,000	2,500,000	28,500,000	68,000,000

The total stock of wheat in this country and Canada is here shown to be 2,222,000 bushels smaller than a year ago, 13,193,000 bushels smaller than in 1901, and 13,193,000 bushels smaller than in 1900 and 7,141,000 bushels smaller than in 1890. In fact, with the single exception of 1898, when visible supplies were about 8,000,000 bushels smaller than they are now, visible stocks of wheat are the lightest held for eleven years past.—Barr's Street.

Isaac Snider, formerly of the Winnipeg flour mills, has leased the roller mills at Morden, Man., from C. F. Hecks.

Substitution is not profitable in the long run. Every housekeeper in Canada knows that there is no other Starch quite so good as

CELESTINE

and the merchant who urges another brand will probably advantage his competitor. The profit (33 p.c.) is good enough for all good grocers.

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