

the infallible Judge of controversy, as the decision of the question rests upon the exercise of private judgment, and is therefore liable to all the uncertainty of Protestantism, while the conviction of its reality depends only on moral certainty, or rather a strong presumption or high degree of probability, which may be easily counterbalanced by internal evidence arising from the practical consequences of the admission of this principle. We are told, indeed, that it is impossible to secure perfect unity of doctrine among Christians without submitting their opinions to an infallible Judge. -But if God has not appointed any such Judge, it must be highly dangerous to adopt his decisions as the rule of our faith; and further, as we are convinced that his decisions are, in many important points, contrary to the Word of God, we feel bound to reject his guidance, as being only calculated to lead us into error. We are told that if all men would submit to his decisions, there would be an end of all disputes. True, there might be an appearance of perfect unity, cold as death, silent as the grave; but it would be the unity of darkness, in which all colors agree, the unity of error and not of truth, and we think it infinitely better to differ on some minor points than to agree in the profession of dangerous errors. We are reminded, still, of the analogy of temporal Courts, and of the absurdity of private men interpreting the Law in opposition to the Judge. We admit that the parallel would be complete, if the Pope could prove his commission from Christ as clearly as every Judge can prove his commission from his Sovereign. In every case of appeal, the Judge's authority to hear and decide the cause must be perfectly clear; but we deny that the Pope has any divine authority given him for this purpose, as the proof of it rests upon a principle which is itself the very subject of dispute, and