

alarmed by it. This reluctance, again, is emphasized in Canada's failure to support Mr. Lloyd George in the Chanak affair, in Canada's controversy with Britain over the Treaty of Lausanne, and over the treaty-making power generally, and in fact goes a long way toward explaining the post-war development of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Fundamental Factors in the Forming  
of Canadian Foreign Policy.

With this historical introduction, I would like to suggest the three or four facts or circumstances that I consider of primary importance in any consideration of Canadian Foreign Policy.

The first of these is the natural desire to be allowed to develop her own resources and to build up her own industrial and economic order unhampered by the troubles of Europe and Asia. This desire has been and still is one of the principal factors in American foreign policy, and those of you who are Americans will understand this feeling, and sympathize with us in our fear of entangling alliances.

At the same time it must be admitted that this desire for freedom from responsibility, however natural, is an indication of adolescence not of maturity, and is a further proof, if proof is necessary, that both of our countries are comparative new-comers in the field of international relations and diplomacy. The older countries of the world, France for instance, realize from bitter experience that immunity from responsibility and from action cannot be achieved in this day and generation by refusing to face facts and by adopting an attitude of isolation. They seek safety in a multitude of guarantees and mutual commitments, both open and secret.

The second factor in order of importance in shaping Canadian foreign policy is our political attachment to Great Britain and our membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The full extent of the responsibilities arising out of these relationships are a constant source of uncertainty and anxiety in all parts of the Empire, but nowhere more so than in Canada because of our position vis-a-vis the United States. Without going into the pros and cons of this, I think it can safely be said that most responsible Canadians assume that if Great Britain is involved in any war of major importance, that Canada will inevitably be drawn in, with one exception - trouble between Britain and the United States.

And that brings me to the third important factor in Canadian foreign policy, namely, the economic and geographical attachment of Canada to the United States. This is of a more permanent nature than our relationship to Great Britain and is in many respects of greater importance; and its existence forces alert Canadian statesmen to scrutinize with the greatest care every difference of opinion between the United States and Great Britain, or between the United States and the rest of the world, as witness for instance, the stand of Mr. Meighen in 1921 toward the situation in the Pacific Area, or more recently our concern at the possibility of naval competition between Great Britain and the United States.