Nuclear Exports

new safeguards to apply in the renegotiation of agreements for supplies of uranium to any country which does not live up to those safeguards?

• (1600)

Mr. Jamieson: I understand the hon. member's question, but with respect I should point out that there is a difference in that the countries that I referred to in terms of uranium sales are already, with the exception of France, NPT signatories, and therefore in that sense they meet the requirements of the policy.

Over and above that, however, we have safeguards agreements, bilateral ones, relating to the sale of Canadian uranium, and it is that issue which is in question in terms of the countries I mentioned—Euratom, Switzerland and Japan. It would not be a matter of adhering to this policy; it would be in some respects something beyond this particular policy because it would be a specific bilateral arrangement between us.

I might point out that while progress has been made, the problem with the Euratom situation in particular is that there are some nine governments involved, and it has not been easy to get all of them together and to meet precisely the same commitments. That is why I mentioned, as an alternative, the possibility of bilaterals. If at the end of the year there is no agreement in place for a continuation, we would have to decide whether progress was sufficient to allow us to continue shipments on an interim basis or if we would simply disrupt shipments as of December 31.

Mr. Gillies: Just to make it absolutely clear in my mind, do I understand from the minister's answer which he has just given that the safeguards announced today will not cover the export of uranium which has been renegotiated?

Mr. Jamieson: Yes, it will.

Mr. Gillies: Then that is where I am in difficulty with the minister's answer. In the case of France and other Euratom countries to which we export uranium, but particularly France, the policy of the government is to negotiate a bilateral agreement rather than have this safeguard apply to the particular contracts which are coming up for renegotiation. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Jamieson: I can genuinely appreciate the hon member's problem because I had it myself for quite a while before I finally began to understand it. I should make the side comment with regard to France, which is not covered by the policy because it is a nuclear weapons state. In the other cases, Canada has had for many years a uranium export policy. There are safeguards under the uranium export policy which are somewhat different from the over-all policy that I have enunciated today regarding the sale of CANDU's, technology and all the other things, but also including uranium. Therefore a uranium customer would have to meet the requirements of the general policy, and in addition to that would also have to meet the requirements of the bilateral safeguards which Canada has had for many years and which have been changed

quite frequently with regard to the sale of uranium to individual customers.

I should point out that in the case both of the European customers and Japan they are already signatories to the NPT. That is what makes the decision whether we continue to ship or not one which can only be decided at the last moment when we hear how far the negotiations have gone. If it appears that we are in sight of signing, that would make for quite a different situation than if there were a total refusal to accept our bilateral safeguards. I hope I have made the situation somewhat clearer for the hon, member.

Mr. Maine: Mr. Speaker, my question stems from the comments of the hon. member for Don Valley (Mr. Gillies) and his reply to the statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Jamieson). I am afraid he inadvertently misled the House when he said that India exploded a nuclear device from material obtained from a CANDU reactor. That is not true, Mr. Speaker. A CANDU reactor produces electricity; it is a research reactor that produced the plutonium which India used to make a nuclear device.

My question relates to research reactors and the reactors used for making nuclear devices. It is Canada's policy now to stop the export of research reactors, as it did after helping India establish the technology needed to explode a device? If it is not Canada's policy now to export technology enabling countries to construct research reactors, do these safeguards that have now been announced take this fact into account and safeguard Canada from any further misuse of technology derived from Canada?

Mr. Jamieson: Mr. Speaker, I learned long ago not to argue with a scientist. I think I will take that question as notice, except to say that I recall having discussed very small reactors for medical purposes, or some kind of nuclear device for medical research purposes. I would have to get behind the curtains with the hon. member to understand fully the import of his question. There is only one policy and that is the one we announced today. I believe that the only possible exceptions to it might be, as I said, very small units designed for medical research, but I am subject to correction on that highly technical point.

Mr. Speaker: Order, please. There is no hope of concluding the questioning with one question on either one side or the other. I did indicate earlier that I would conclude with the question of the hon. member for Wellington (Mr. Maine). I now see several other hon. members who are interested. If the Standing Order asks me to make a judgment during the course of the questioning as to how long the questioning should go, I always try to base that judgment on the number of members seeking the floor at that time. Having made that assessment, sometimes other hon. members seek the floor and this puts the Chair in a difficult position. I feel that under the circumstances I have given fair spread and variety to the questioning and that we should conclude it at this point.