

It may be to transfer him to a less sensitive employment, as has been the case certainly more than once in the past, where he would not have access to secret and confidential material. But if it is that his dismissal must be recommended, the individual will be given a second hearing, this time by the deputy minister or head of the agency. If that interview does not resolve the doubts, and if the agency head agrees with the view that dismissal is necessary, the whole case and the relevant information, including anything that the employee himself has submitted, will be submitted to a board of review.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say something about the government's advisory agency on security policy. This agency, which has been in operation now for a good many years, is called the security panel. It is composed of senior officers, mostly of deputy minister rank, who have had years of responsibility and experience in the personnel and administrative fields. Security is not their main or sole responsibility. Advice on policy in this area has to be based not on security alone but on a broad understanding of the nature of our democratic institutions and principles, on the policies of government, on the requirements of administration, and finally, and importantly, on the needs of security.

The government has decided that the board of review to which I have referred should be drawn from the members of the security panel. In all cases they will be men who have not been involved in the particular case. They will come to it without bias or preconception. There is no question at all in my mind but that they will provide as fair, humane and sound an evaluation of every case as can be provided in this difficult field.

The board of review will provide its views on each case where dismissal is recommended. It will then be for the responsible minister, in the light of all the information and study, to decide whether or not to recommend dismissal to the governor in council.

I think, Mr. Speaker, that these procedures are as painstaking and thorough as can be devised to ensure the protection both of the safety of essential classified government information and of the welfare and rights of the employee.

A most difficult aspect of security, and one which has always been a matter of concern, is the necessity of taking into account the character and activities of an employee's immediate relatives, or their places of residence. The question has often and properly been asked: Why should a man be denied a security clearance because his father, his uncle, or even his estranged wife, may have

been engaged in subversive activity, or may be an active communist? It is not the kind of relationship, whether by blood, marriage or friendship, which is of primary concern. It is its closeness in degree and the circumstances surrounding it in respect of the nature of the job, most particularly the extent of influence that might be exerted, which must dictate a judgment as to a person's reliability. And reliability, of course, is something more than loyalty. It is usually very difficult to establish this, but that does not remove the need of trying to do so.

The collective experience of all nations of the western alliance agrees on the necessity of exploring these difficult matters and arriving at a considered judgment. This experience also shows that security may be in danger if a person in sensitive employment has a mother, father or other close relative behind the iron curtain. Human emotions cannot be expected to be proof against the possible anguish of a loved one—and the brutal fact is that such anguish may be imposed by those who are ruthless in getting, or trying to get, what they want. These are harsh and unpleasant facts, but they do not go away if we pretend that they do not exist.

I feel confident that the procedures which we are now adopting will assist us in making judgments concerning loyalty and reliability in a manner which will protect individual rights as well as national interests.

In making this statement, I hope I have contributed to a better understanding of the principles and issues involved in this aspect of national security, and the means by which we endeavour to preserve it and discharge our responsibility in government.

I have necessarily spoken in general terms, but if the committee would agree—and I know this is an unusual procedure—my colleague the Minister of Justice could follow me and fill in some of the details.

Mr. Diefenbaker: If you let me precede the hon. gentleman, he could answer me and then the detail could be set out.

Mr. Chevrier: The statement I have to make follows upon that which the Prime Minister has just made and, if I might have the permission of the committee to do so, I should like to make it now. If it were separated from the speech which has just been made, I think the effect would be spoiled.

The Chairman: Is that agreeable?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Chevrier: I wish to say at the outset that I think this is a rare occasion, one of the few occasions which I have seen, at least, in