

treaty may not be negotiable with key non-nuclear states. They may well refuse to accede until they have what they consider to be an appropriate quid pro quo or reciprocal obligation from the nuclear powers.

What sort of obligation do they have in mind? One that has been mentioned is the extension of security guarantees to exposed and insecure non-nuclear signatories by the nuclear powers. Such guarantees obviously imply commitments and risks, involving perhaps embarrassing and troublesome entanglements in causes and purposes to which a guarantor might not be especially sympathetic. But is it not true that such commitments and risks are inseparable from status as a great power? Surely this is part of the price which the nuclear powers must pay if their monopoly of nuclear weapons is to be maintained. Canada has found it necessary to reiterate, both in public and in private, that the alternative may well be the diffusion of control over nuclear weapons and the emergence of an unstable situation with worse consequences than would be entailed in the provision of acceptable guarantees.

Another obligation we should like to see is the acceptance of safeguards on nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes by the nuclear as well as non-nuclear signatories. It is logical enough for the nuclear powers to argue that, since the purpose of safeguards in a non-proliferation treaty is to prevent the clandestine production of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear signatories, safeguards need apply only to the latter. But, if it is correct, as the nuclear powers insist, that safeguards would in no way inhibit the peaceful nuclear activities or expose them to commercial espionage, why then do they reject such safeguards for themselves? An ardent supporter of the IAEA and its safeguards system, Canada has been advocating a non-discriminatory safeguards article in a treaty. I must also express my satisfaction at indications that at least some of the nuclear powers have become more receptive to the idea of accepting international safeguards on their own peaceful nuclear programmes.

A further obligation we are urging the nuclear powers to accept in conjunction with a non-proliferation treaty is a precise commitment to offer a nuclear explosive service for legitimate peaceful purposes to the non-nuclear states, which, as you know, will be asked to give up their right to conduct their own "peaceful" nuclear explosions. There is, understandably, some reluctance on the part of the nuclear powers to acknowledge more than the principle. They say it is impossible to lay down the detailed procedures before such a service becomes technically feasible, but this is small consolation to those non-nuclear states which genuinely feel that their right to the full and unfettered use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is being unfairly restricted. We think the nuclear powers should go much farther than mere acceptance of the principle; they should demonstrate their intentions in this respect by undertaking a commitment elaborated in reasonable detail, even at the cost of future ability to dictate the precise terms under which the service will be offered. And I think such a commitment should specifically include a supervisory role for an international agency such as the IAEA or some similar body.

The discussion of peaceful nuclear explosions brings me now to the problem of "vertical proliferation". Non-nuclear states are almost unanimous in their demand that the nuclear powers should, in return for the renunciation