

For these reasons, before considering certain detailed aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty, it is important to examine the validity of some of the assumptions which gave rise to the idea of the Treaty in the first place. An open-minded inquiry into them raises several intriguing questions; for instance, to what extent is the security of America dependent on conditions in Europe? Also, why should the provisions of a piece of paper called the Atlantic Treaty work any better than the Briand-Kellogg or Locarno Pacts?

International issues are usually approached on the basis of the judgment we make as to their effect on our own national or personal security. Certainly the North Atlantic Treaty is no exception to this rule. Can it be justified on that score? In this favoured continent, the temptation to mind our own business — in the hope that others will do likewise — is always present. Because of the cost, the vexations and frustrations which are a part of active participation in the affairs of a confused and turbulent world, it is wise to keep reminding ourselves of the circumstances which would make a retreat to isolation or partial isolation unrealistic and unwise.

Warnings against such a retreat dwell usually on the wonders and the horrors of modern science which has re-shaped the world in our lifetime, and has far outpaced man's social development. You will, I hope, forgive me for emphasizing once again this fundamental aspect of international relations because it sometimes seems that of the many and complex dangers which we face, the greatest of them all is the danger of ignoring the obvious.

We have all too quickly become accustomed to the idea that a plane can circle the globe without stopping; that an atomic bomb can be delivered anywhere; that it may soon be possible to fire deadly missiles across oceans; that bacteriological warfare opens up whole new chapters in the already highly developed technique of human destruction. While we cannot be otherwise than aware of these grim concepts, we have almost begun to take them for granted. Certainly we have hesitated to accept soberly and fully the political implications which the advances of science have in this century thrust upon us whether we like it or not. In 1901 the Chief of Police of Chicago made a record-breaking dash around the world which took sixty days. Politically and socially we are still going around the world in 60 days. We should, however, base our international outlook on the sixty-hour global non-stop flight. When we do, it becomes immediately obvious that it would be just as difficult for this continent to live with security in isolation as it would be for a wealthy man to live alone in safety in a lawless slum.

In the absence of a strong and workable supranational legal and political order the threat of aggression is always present whether it originates in Germany, Italy or Japan, as before the recent war; or whether it emerges in a somewhat different form as at present. It is unfortunately perfectly clear that the rule of law cannot yet be established internationally. It seems to me to be equally clear that while the United Nations can do and is doing many good things, and while we should keep striving to make it more effective, nevertheless it cannot in present circumstances give any of its members that security against aggression which they seek. It follows, therefore, that the next best way of dealing with aggression, or the threat of aggression, is for friendly states who have confidence in each other's pacific intentions to band together in order to be in the position to take collective police action against an aggressor. The first aim of

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