

ensure that aid supplies reach their intended recipients. Nigel Fisher echoed these concerns, noting that humanitarian agencies require capacity and access if they are to perform the tasks which states expect of them.

Following a break for lunch, participants were asked to consider the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan as a test case for the imposition of UNSC sanctions. Andras Vamos-Goldman began the session by providing an overview of the diplomatic events which followed the Indian test. His account emphasized the political cleavages between those advocating a strong response, and those who were unwilling to take a hard-line against India for political reasons.

Mr. Vamos-Goldman also outlined a series of general conditions which would enable Canada to take the lead role in responding to a similar situation, should one arise during our term on the Council. First, he argued, Canada would require timely political and military intelligence and high-level connections to the parties involved. Second, in order to facilitate a swift response (thereby increasing Canada's ability to influence the course of the Council's response) there must be short, tight decision-making lines within the Canadian policy-making apparatus. Third, Canada must be able to gauge the mood of the international community, in order to promote a politically viable approach to the problem at hand. Finally, Canada is most likely to prove effective when it is viewed as a credible actor with regard to the issue under consideration.

Ingrid Hall (D.G. South and Southeast Asia Bureau) then provided an account of the events surrounding the India-Pakistan case. Ms. Hall noted that Canada developed the tactic of taking aid money intended for India and holding it out to Pakistan as a positive incentive to refrain from conducting nuclear tests. However, she expressed frustration at Canada's inability