

there could be difficulties in shifting away from a favoured methodology to others that may be more appropriate. With respect to the safeguarded activities, the Agency focuses on industrial production processes. In these, its control systems may overlap to some degree with, and thus exploit, state regulatory and plant operation control systems. If other sorts of activities were monitored, however, other indicators and techniques would be relevant.

6. The use of inspection as a safeguards technique must be considered not only with respect to the activity safeguarded and the objective of safeguards but also with respect to the other techniques with which it will be employed. These can both ease and complicate the inspector's task, as well as make it more acceptable to safeguarded states and facility operators. One task of the inspector is precisely to verify the integrity of the broader safeguards system as applied at a specific facility.
7. The Agency's distinction among ad hoc, routine and special inspections suggests that such distinctions could be valuable and that different specific inspection purposes may require different routines and procedures. Special inspections present some possible similarities to challenge inspections, as do surprise or short-notice inspections. The limited Agency use of the latter, however, also suggests some potential difficulties for challenge inspections, at least at declared facilities.
8. Aside from difficulties with specific techniques, the Agency has had problems integrating its safeguards systems across Material Balance Areas within and between facilities. The handling of shipping information seems to be a particular problem, not only in the design of an information system but also in the performance of shippers and receivers. This difficulty limits the Agency's safeguards, including its ability to use interstate shipments to cross-check within-state data.
9. Anomalies should be regarded as more than just "objective" indicators of possible diversions. They may be created by a variety of conditions, and so must be investigated and assessed. They may also in a sense be artifacts of a safeguards system, or at least generated by the interaction of that system with its environment. This should affect both the design of a system and the interpretation of its findings. The interpretation and assessment of anomalies will inescapably have both technical and political aspects.