

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

We also want a convention that realizes our goal of a total ban to be global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable. These three terms are not just catchwords; in our view they are essential if there is to be a total ban.

By "global", we mean a convention to which all of us here (members and observers alike) - and the approximately 80 other States not participating in these negotiations - will wish to become parties. We seek a convention which has addressed the security interests of CW-possessors and non-possessors alike. In this respect, we have carefully noted the recent statements of the Egyptian representative, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, of the Chinese representative, and of the representatives of the United States and the USSR concerning the latter's joint proposals for revisions to the draft convention, contained in document CD/CW/WP.303. My Government believes that the issues raised and the related concerns and differences of view expressed by these and other speakers are vitally important to the nature of the future convention. They must be addressed by us in a thorough and frank manner in our actual negotiations, as opposed to being aired in statements in plenary.

By "comprehensive", we mean a convention that bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons; that provides for the complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities; and that otherwise encompasses all activities that might be relevant to its goals. A convention that does not unequivocally provide these results raises serious concerns in our mind. These concerns stem from our position on globality. The convention must attract the widest possible adherence. The surest path to widest adherence is through the convention's comprehensiveness, i.e. complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities by the end of the envisaged 10-year destruction period as is provided for in the current rolling text. To Canada, this implies an undertaking at the outset of the convention to pursue these destruction processes to their completion.

By "effectively verifiable", we mean a convention that empowers the implementing organization with the means and authority to investigate, inspect and pursue any activity that might be related to non-compliance with the convention.

While all three criteria are essential, I should like to underline the importance of the last, and truly effective verification régime. This in our view would be the only way to provide us with the necessary confidence in, and the means of ensuring, a total ban. The implementing organization must not only be responsible for supervising or monitoring the complete and final destruction of declared stocks and production facilities, and the activities of declared facilities producing scheduled chemicals; it must also be able to investigate activities and, as necessary, inspect undeclared facilities.

We are therefore convinced that, to be effective, the verification régime under the convention must be as complete as possible and intrusive to an extent not hitherto realized under any other arms control agreement. In the first instance, this means a challenge inspection component of exceptional rigour. Whether we call it "challenge inspection" or "inspection on request"