

Barros speculated that Emma's own apartment would be a mite tiny, and that she would have to borrow a friend's. Because she knew the Sokolovs of the Soviet Embassy, their home must have been it. Barros then mixes in another dinner he has heard about from Mrs. Igor Gouzenko; it might, he indicates, or might not, be the same one, but a potential Prime Minister was expected. Mrs. Gouzenko, cooked the piroshki at her home to avoid stinking up the Sokolov residence with the aroma of cabbage. It may seem a trifle improbable that a Soviet diplomat would risk entertaining, in a small party, an External cypher clerk who was spying for the Kremlin, and two senior officials from her own department.

But Barros is nothing but serious, and poses the big question: "Was it Pearson or Norman who was being scrutinized?" He decides "Pearson." Although not certain that the hosts saw him as the future Prime Minister, Barros concludes: "It can be said that eminent Canadians, doubtlessly including Pearson and Norman, were guests at a dinner cooked by Emma Woikin" who herself sat at the table. (162) It is conceivable, he speculates boldly, "that a written report ... was hand-carried to Moscow by Motinov [an Embassy official] in early July ..." (162).

Assuming the improbable that Emma's dinner really did occur, why did it strike our sleuth as being so sinister? The Soviet Union, after all, was at the time Canada's gallant ally. Barros' suspicion was further aroused, however, by a lunch that Pearson had shared with a Soviet diplomat in Washington. He had found him interesting and thought they might meet again. He took the precaution, however, of sending an inquiry to Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary, about the man's background. It might seem an unusual way to start a liaison dangereuse, but not to a professional spy catcher. (Barros 198-9)

A frequent Barros technique to impress the gullible is to describe in a seemingly professional manner the "tradecraft" of the Soviet intelligence service, and then assume that that is what must have happened in the "espionage case of Herbert Norman." For example, having explained that every Soviet agent is "run" by a "controller," Barros indulges in eight pages of speculation about who Norman's controllers probably were. (149-59) This is without ever establishing that Norman was an agent. Similarly he raises the question of Norman's "talent spotter," before introducing any evidence that he had in fact been spotted. (7)

Guilt by association, of course, is the sturdiest tool in the spy-catcher kit. In a book devoid of specific deeds, it is employed on almost every page. A gross example is the