

greatly improved the timeliness, accuracy and completeness of the early warning detection process.

The early warning system was further enhanced on June 20, 1978, with the installation of a remotely controlled day and night television camera overlooking the Gidi West sensor field. Prior to the camera's installation, this field could not be seen from either the watch station or SFM Headquarters, thus creating a significant delay before objects passing through the field could be identified. The use of remote imaging, however, allowed a camera operator at Gidi East — some 22.5 km away — to identify an object shortly after it first entered the Gidi West sensor field. The sounding of a sensor alarm alerted the operator who then focussed the camera on the activated sensor and observed any activity on a TV monitor. Remote imaging, then, provided an observation capability nearly as good as the visual capability of the manned watch stations associated with the other three sensor fields.<sup>18</sup>

Beyond working to improve detection and identification functions on the ground, the field staff sought to improve the detection and identification of aircraft flying over the early warning area. Originally conceived as observation posts from which only ground activity was to be monitored, the three watch stations were not well suited to observing aircraft, which could approach the watch stations from any angle and pass over them undetected.<sup>19</sup> To remedy this "blind spot", observation booths with optical and electro-optical equipment were positioned on top of each watch station.

### 3(c) *US Monitoring of the Egyptian-Israeli National Surveillance Stations*

In accordance with the terms of the Sinai II Agreement, Egypt and Israel were each allowed to operate one national surveillance station (at each end of the Gidi Pass) whose functions were to be limited to visual and electronic surveillance. Each station, staffed by no more than 250 personnel, was prohibited from housing offensive weapons, though small arms were permitted. SFM civilian liaison officers were charged with the responsibility of verifying the procedures at each surveillance station. Present at both stations at all times, a US civilian liaison officer performed the monitoring duties from a small building overlooking and adjacent to the entrance gate of the assigned station. Equipped with a primary VHF communications system, the liaison officer was assured of instant access to the SFM Headquarters and was also able to facilitate communication between SFM Headquarters and the two national stations.<sup>20</sup> Concerned with maintaining credibility, US personnel sought to execute their role in a strictly even-handed manner by ensuring that identical verification procedures were used at each station.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>20</sup> United States Sinai Support Mission, *Report to the Congress*, April 13, 1976, p. 26.

