

of the Trident II from the freeze injunction. A second amendment stated that “. . . nothing in this resolution is intended to prevent the United States from carrying out its responsibilities under the 1979 NATO decision regarding intermediate-range nuclear forces,” thereby allowing the planned deployment of the cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. In short, the freeze resolution passed, but it was far from a comprehensive freeze, and it was a declaration of the *objectives* that the Administration should pursue in the START negotiations, *not* an instruction to freeze.

One final stage in the American debate might be noted. After a meeting of the Freeze Campaign in late 1983, pro-freeze support shifted to a partial or ‘quick’ freeze. The essential idea was to concentrate on the weapons which allowed verification with a high degree of confidence such as the testing of new kinds of ballistic missiles. A resolution to this effect was introduced into Congress in early 1984, but was not passed. It will be remembered that by this time the United States was heavily committed to the deployment of new weapons, especially the MX ICBM, the Trident II SLBM, and the B-1 bomber. In a last, determined effort at the end of the first term of the Reagan Administration, freeze supporters attempted to obtain the endorsement of the Democratic candidates for the Presidency. Although they achieved some success, the Democratic candidate, Walter Mondale, was less than total in his support: while showing sympathy for the desire to control the escalation of the arms race, Mondale noted that he would not support a freeze that “we could not verify every day.” Since no serious freeze proponent argued that this was either feasible or necessary, Mondale was clearly distancing himself from the advocates of a comprehensive freeze.

THE DEBATE AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The initial resolutions on a comprehensive freeze were presented in the First Committee of the General Assembly, and then in plenary session, in 1982. One resolution was sponsored by Mexico and Sweden, the other by India. These resolutions have been repeated since. In each case they passed by wide margins, but with most of the NATO countries voting against. At the 1983 Session the Soviet Union added its own resolution, also repeated in 1984 and 1985: it also passed by wide margins, but with somewhat more abstentions and votes against.

Of these resolutions, the Mexican/Swedish was the most explicit. It called for “an immediate nuclear arms freeze” to include:

- the complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems

- a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems
- the complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes

In contrast to the Congressional resolutions, the Mexican/Swedish resolution suggested that the freeze would be accomplished by declaration: the superpowers, either jointly or separately, would declare the freeze to have started, and, in the five-year period contemplated, other nuclear powers were expected to join so that the freeze could be extended indefinitely.

The resolution also called for “all relevant measures of verification,” and specifically referred to the procedures used in the SALT I and SALT II Treaties, and to the measures contemplated in the unsuccessful trilateral negotiations in Geneva among the US, USSR and UK for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB).

The Indian resolution, although less explicit than the Mexican/Swedish one, and emphasizing somewhat different aspects, conveyed essentially the same proposals. At first sight so did the Soviet resolution. The Soviet phrasing, however, is slightly less clear, and some analysts have suggested that there are sufficient loopholes in the wording to allow the claim that existing Soviet missiles — stockpiled but not deployed — would be permissible under the Soviet resolution, while the American INF deployments in Europe (the cruise and Pershing II missiles) would have been prohibited. The Soviet resolution also implied that the freeze would be started with a bilateral declaration rather than a negotiation. Finally, the Soviet resolution spoke of ‘appropriate verification,’ which, in subsequent debate, was explained by the Soviet spokesman as “methods of verification similar to those adopted in previous arms limitation agreements.”

The UN debates on these resolutions were characterized not by a concern about adequate verification and an improved climate for further arms control negotiations — but by a concern with the balance of forces. On the one hand, the neutral and non-aligned states emphasized the frightening size of the nuclear arsenals, and the prospects that the arms race would eventually lead to annihilation. Echoing the movement in the United States, the Mexican/Swedish resolution and accompanying statements were essentially a call to halt the arms race. The Soviet Union and its allies emphasized that the time was propitious for a freeze, since, in the Soviet statement, “the present approximate parity of nuclear and conventional capabilities” meant that a freeze would not affect the security of either superpower or, by extension, their allies.