

That arbitration is described as "a negotiation," and it is far from improbable that many of those who read the report of the speech will draw the inference that it was of the same character as the other treaties that are referred to in the language that we have quoted. Sir Richard Cartwright is well aware of the difference between an arbitration and a negotiation, and ought not to have used a term that was calculated to mislead. It was under the provisions of the treaty styled "the Washington capitulation" that the value of the fisheries was left to the determination of three arbitrators, who took evidence on the subject and made their award, it is to be presumed, in accordance therewith. It is not surprising that our neighbors should imagine that they were made to pay an exorbitant price for their right of fishing when a Canadian statesman, who occupied at the time the position of Finance Minister, publicly boasts, amid tremendous cheering, that the award was due to the fact that the umpire was "under the guidance of Alexander Galt, and Albert Smith," and not to the weight of evidence. There is not the slightest analogy between the negotiation of a treaty, either of peace or of commerce, and an arbitration.

We fail altogether to comprehend the application of the term "capitulation" to the Treaty of Washington. Do Sir Richard Cartwright and his admirers hold, that it would have been better for Great Britain and the United States to have settled their long pending dispute by war, rather than by reference to the eminent diplomatists who sat at Geneva, and who not only rejected all the consequential claims, but gave damages only in the cases of the Alabama and Florida, and partially the Shenandoah, entirely rejecting the claims on account of six other vessels. Was it a capitulation to leave the St. Juan boundary dispute to the arbitration of a friendly sovereign? The one ground of complaint was the refusal of the United States to entertain the claim for damages on account of the Fenian invasions of Canadian territory; and, with regard to that, Great Britain, by relieving Canada from its pledge to spend a large sum on useless fortifications, and by guaranteeing the interest on a large loan, virtually subsidized it to an extent greater in all probability than any amount of damages that it would have been able to establish as the result of Fenian invasions.

The "Ashburton surrender" is a notable instance of the conflicting views of the parties specially interested. It may be admitted that the term applied by Sir Richard Cartwright to the treaty of

1842 is in accordance with Canadian opinion, but on the other hand it is well known that the opinion of the people of Maine is that they lost a considerable extent of territory. It is well to bear in mind that of the territory in dispute Maine got seven-twelfths and Canada five-twelfths, that the treaty was so unsatisfactory to the United States Senate that it was some time before its ratification could be secured, and that Maine was paid \$500,000 for the land of which it held that it was deprived by the treaty. There is a prevailing idea that Lord Ashburton. (Right Hon. Alexander Baring) was biassed in favor of the United States with which country he had intimate social relations. On the other hand, this fact was what induced Sir Robert Peel to select him as one more likely to be listened to by Mr. Webster, then Secretary of State of the United States. There are some who believe that, if Great Britain had adopted a bullying tone, and threatened war unless her demands were granted, she would have been more successful. Possibly when Canada obtains the powers which Sir Richard Cartwright demands, that Statesman may have an opportunity of testing the result of a dictatorial policy towards the United States. It is worth giving a few extracts from Sir Robert Peel's speech on the address, in 1843:

"I was glad to hear the hon. gentleman's frank and fair admission with respect to the settlement of the boundary question, and I feel satisfied that I shall be able, when the occasion offers, to shew to the House and to the country generally, the extent of the obligation under which they lie to the noble Lord (Ashburton) by whom that adjustment has been effected. . . . But considering the uncertainty attached to the old treaty, considering the great length of time which had since elapsed, taking into account that the geography of the country was in a great degree unknown at the time of first assigning the boundaries, and considering the difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of exactly ascertaining the intentions of those by whom the assignment was made, we should feel satisfied to accept, not it is true all that we claim, or all that we are entitled to, but such a division of the disputed district as secures our British possessions in North America, and at the same time preserves our military communication intact. The adjustment of the question by Lord Ashburton is far more favorable to this country than that formerly proposed by the King of the Netherlands, and in which we were willing to concur. . . . In America Mr. Webster was animated by the same desire for a conciliatory settlement of the question, which influenced Lord Ashburton. How was he met because, in endeavoring to effect a settlement he consented to recede from some of his pretensions, seeing that there was no other way to arrive at a satisfactory adjust-

ment? The same taunts which were applied to an Ashburton here, were levelled at a Webster there; both were accused of abandoning the interests of their respective countries, but fortunately Mr. Webster was not to be moved by these taunts, and by a moderate course in which the two countries mutually consented to abandon the assertion of their extreme demands, without diminishing the honor of either, a peaceful settlement was effected by which two people, kindred in descent, kindred in language, and, rightly understood, kindred in interests, were united in peaceful relations."

THE ST. LAWRENCE CHANNEL.

The *Hamilton Spectator* is most pertinacious in his attacks on the policy of improving the channel of the St. Lawrence. We are glad to find that in his last notice of the subject, our contemporary has made an assertion on which we are quite ready to join issue, and we only wish that some competent authority could be found to decide the point. We shall cite in his own words the position taken by the *Spectator*:—"Given a thousand tons of grain at Hamilton, Chicago, or Thunder Bay, it can be carried in Lake vessels to Quebec, and thence to Liverpool by ocean vessels, as cheaply as though the transfer of cargo were made at Montreal, and return cargo can likewise be carried as cheaply to any interior port if the transfer be made at Quebec, as though the ocean voyage be continued to Montreal." We readily concede that if the foregoing statements be correct it was a gross blunder to spend money in deepening the channel of the St. Lawrence, but we are thoroughly persuaded that our contemporary is under a complete delusion on the subject. We fail to discover any ground for questioning the soundness of the opinion given by the American engineers in 1858, that the transfer from lake craft to ocean vessels can be made most economically at the highest point in the river that can be found, and Montreal, being at the foot of the Lachine rapids, must be that point. The completion of the canals would make no difference whatever so long as there is a necessity for transshipment. Granting, for the sake of argument, all that the *Spectator* claims as the result of the enlargement of the canals, freight charges would always be proportionately cheaper to Montreal than to Quebec, and the transfer to the ocean vessels would continue to be made at Montreal. We did not state that any of the ports on the Mississippi were in the same position as Montreal, but that the improvements made in the navigable rivers of the United States, which have been considerable, have always been assumed by the Federal Government.