

not well adapted to express the abstractions of metaphysical science. Take for instance the following passage in which, in the *Dublin Review* for January 1871, Wm. Geo. Ward summarizes the teachings of Thomistic ontology, which he says is founded upon the plainest experimental processes. He then proceeds: "The sense presents an object. The first thing that the mind does is to perceive that it is. It is a being. By further experience, it perceives that it changes from time to time; that it is now of one color, now of another, first round and then square. Two new conceptions are the result; that of accident or mode, which expresses that permanent thing in which the modes inhere. But the mind, considering further, sees that if all mode were to disappear, there would be nothing left but an abstraction; and from this it obtains the idea of Individuation. Considering next the concept, just gained, of substance, it cannot help seeing that there is a difference between substance and substance; for it sees that there are some substances which are so completely *sui juris* that they do not require another substance for their existence and operation; others, on the contrary, are not their own, but are the property, so to speak, of another, of which they, in a certain sense, form part, and to which their operations are attributed. In this way Socrates, for instance, is different from his arm or his head. This discrimination furnishes the mind with the idea of a Suppositum, or Person, as distinguished from a nature or substance which has not suppositality or personality. Looking now at the substance, essence, or nature (these words are distinguishable and distinct, but not for our present purpose), the

mind perceives that this can change into another substance or essence; that bread, for instance, may become flesh; one activity, or group of activities disappears, and another succeeds; with this peculiar feature, however, that those activities thus succeeding one another have this in common, that they are also passive. This analysis results in those two horns of the Peripatetics, form and matter, terms which are employed, by analogy, in many other genera besides that of substance. But to proceed. The mind, having made out the idea, Form, looks at it by itself, irrespective of what we call matter. Even now it is limited; it is not infinite; it is made up of activity, and some kind of passivity. The mind generalizes once more. Every being is made up of Act and Power (potentiality). Especially, it is made up of what is and its existence; for its essence does not imply actual existence. But suppose that it should? Then the mind conceives the idea of a being that is Pure Act, without any admixture of potentiality, and whose very existence is to be. This is God."



#### OBITUARY.

To the Rev. Father Rousseau the OWL extends the sympathy of the student-body and his fellow professors of the faculty on the death of his mother. Across the wide Atlantic came the news from fair France of the demise of his beloved parent. Again do we proffer our sympathy to Father Rousseau and breathe a fervent prayer for the repose of his mother's soul.

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Another of our graduates has also felt the hand of God laid heavily