

3. I said that we were concerned about the situation and alive to the possibilities of a Soviet coup. This was a most important point and any specific and detailed information which the Belgian Government could give us on a Communist infiltration would be very helpful. We appreciated that in many cases such infiltration was not overt and might be very difficult to document. I added I had witnessed, myself, in Indochina a Communist take-over and that for a while it seemed to me that the local French authorities had been greatly upset. There was a psychological shock involved in transfers of authority but I was sure that the Belgian authorities were taking this into account in making their assessment.

4. In the course of the conversation the Belgian Ambassador made three specific points:

(1) *Cooperation between Belgium and U.N. forces.*

The Belgian Government hope that U.N. forces will not intervene in regions which have remained peaceful or where Belgian troops are in effective control. I said that it seemed to me that the Secretary-General had this problem very much in mind but that it might be unwise to attempt to define too precisely just how far the UN troops should go in taking over from the Belgian units. It would be difficult to find legal justification for the presence of Belgian troops outside their treaty bases once peace and order had been restored and UN forces were in a position to take over.

The Belgian Ambassador said that his Government are of the opinion, that as a matter of priority, UN forces should attempt to restore order in the lower Congo and to liberate European nationals who are now being held prisoners. They should also restore port facilities in Matadi as such facilities are closely linked with the orderly flow of supplies into Leopoldville.

The Belgian authorities hope that UN forces will not intervene in the internal affairs of the Congo and, in particular, will not be despatched to Katanga. I said that from reports received from New York that the Secretary-General was very conscious of the difficulties in this regard. I raised the question whether it was not better to leave matters in the hands of the Secretary-General who seemed to have adopted a practical approach to achieve immediate results in the hope that theoretical issues could be settled later.

(2) As to Katanga, the Belgian Ambassador reported that his Government are anxious to avoid intervention in the internal affairs of that region. They have all along stressed the advantages of unity and maintained that the Congo as a whole is not viable without the resources of Katanga. They wish, however, to draw attention to the fact that order has now returned in Katanga and that there is, in that area, effective local government; the Katanga represents a stronghold of order in an area which is becoming increasingly disorganized. In spite of this, the Belgian Government hesitate very much to extend recognition as requested by the authorities of Katanga because of the danger of war which this would involve with the Congo, but they hope that other countries will extend such support as they can to that part of the Congo.

(3) As to the general situation in the Congo, the Belgian Government point out that, at least for the present, the normal process of government has been replaced by emergency decisions made by political agitators who are without contact with each other and with their constituents. For instance, the decision to break off diplomatic relations with Belgium was made by the Prime Minister who had not informed even his Foreign Minister! In the present circumstances, it seems that, in the lower Congo, the Government is unable to perform even the elementary tasks of Government. The policy of the Belgian Government, and one which they hope friendly governments will also adopt, is to encourage moderate elements so that, in due course, the situation may be stabilized.