

28. On the occasion of the crisis of September 1938 various well-intentioned and patriotic offers to raise forces for service abroad were made by individuals and organizations such as the Canadian Corps Association. It is submitted, however, that the acceptance of offers of this kind can only result in a repetition of the mistakes and confusion of 1914. No private organization in Canada has the experience or resources for an undertaking of such magnitude, nor has it any considered plan. On the other hand the Departmental plan is the product of years of careful thought and effort, and is complete insofar as existing conditions will allow.

29. In drawing up the plan for the raising of the Mobile Force it has constantly been borne in mind that the Government may desire in the first instance to limit Canada's contribution to less than a complete Army Corps. The Mobile Force accordingly has been divided into two roughly equal portions, each comprising one complete division and a quota of ancillary troops. Each of these two halves of the force has been territorially distributed evenly across Canada, as well as the limitations of so small a force permit. We are, therefore, prepared, if necessary, to raise initially only one half of the total force without disrupting the plan.

30. It is submitted, however, that the Government should be made fully aware of the very great advantage to be gained by authorizing the immediate mobilization of the whole force of two divisions and ancillary troops even in the unlikely event of the British Government announcing its inability immediately to complete the equipment of more than one division. That the war will be over before the whole force can be in the field is improbable to a degree, and even if the despatch of the second division were delayed it could do invaluable training in Canada with existing equipment.

31. To summarize, we consider, in the event of a decision on the part of the Government to extend the scope of its present defence policy, that Canada's national war effort, insofar as it relates to the armed forces, might take the following forms:

(a) The Navy's part would be to organize auxiliary forces as rapidly as possible, in order to give protection to shipping against mine and submarine attacks in Canadian waters, and at the same time to assist the British forces in keeping the sea communications clear of enemy vessels. This assistance to be progressively increased as the Naval resources of the country are developed.

(b) Air Force assistance would, as in the case of the Navy, begin with the co-operation rendered in safe-guarding trade routes adjacent to our territory. But in addition, we are in a position from the outset to provide direct intervention in the shape of the personnel for an Army Co-operation Wing of three squadrons and a Bomber Wing of three squadrons, but with no aircraft or equipment.

(c) The Army's contribution would take the form of the immediate raising of an Army Corps of two divisions and ancillary troops (roughly