

The Toronto World

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HAMILTON'S PLIGHT.

Once more Mayor McLaren of Hamilton has played the Cautious Power game by his obstructive tactics in connection with the proposed contract with the hydro-electric power commission. The people have three times voted to make a contract with the hydro-electric commission, and the city council led by the mayor has refused to comply with the popular demand. This is all the more deplorable conduct on the part of a public man like Mayor McLaren, when it is remembered that he was elected upon this very issue. He assured The World's representative last December of his loyalty to the people and the endorsement of The World as a public ownership candidate by that means. His unscrupulous repudiation of those pledges is unfortunately not a solitary instance of the influence exerted by the Cautious Power Company in Hamilton. Nor are denials of duty of this kind confined to Hamilton when, as at North Toronto, elected representatives audaciously scout the popular will for reasons of their own.

But whatever the influences to which elected representatives may succumb the people know what they want, and will continue to demand it. Hamilton's is a particularly flagrant case. After three expressions of opinion and the election of a mayor who represented himself as willing to carry out the people's policy, only to turn round and betray it, Hamilton finds itself under the necessity of beginning all over again its search for a trustworthy mayor and council.

GROWING DEMOCRATIC SPIRIT.

Senator Ross dwelt with apparent satisfaction at the Canadian Club on Monday evening on the more democratic tendency of the Australian constitution, as compared with that of Canada. He especially emphasized the sovereignty of the province. "No court should be allowed to veto the legislation of a province," was an assertion which met with applause. It was a shot at Canadian legislation that the federal government had anything to do with education, was another abandoned sentiment, was another abandoned sentiment. The fact that men and women vote on a parity in Australia and New Zealand, said the senator, also showed a disposition to trust the common people. This recognition of the approach of woman's suffrage is duly significant, and the colonial editor of The London Times, who heard the senator's address, will no doubt communicate the overseas sentiment to the homeland.

When the suffrage bill comes up in the legislature next session, the government will have less excuse than formerly for postponing its consideration. It is possible, if Senator Ross' remarks may be accepted as a token, that the Liberal party will adopt adult suffrage as a plank in its platform. It must at any rate receive consideration at both of the forthcoming conventions.

SOME HAMILTON COLONELS.

Colonel the Honorable John Hendrie, M.L.A., of Hamilton, doesn't seem to get much support in the municipal council of that city for the Whitney-Hendrie hydro-electric power proposition. The gallant colonel has been persistent in his advocacy of the policy; notwithstanding these strenuous efforts of his, however, Colonel McLaren, the Liberal and pro-Gibson-Catactact mayor of the city, has unhorsed him several times. Senator Jaffray will be putting Colonel Hendrie's picture in The Globe as a slight mark of appreciation.

Colonel John Morrison Gibson, late of Hamilton, is watching these proceedings in Hamilton from the end of a wire in Toronto.

Colonel Sir James Pliny Whitney is also looking on, but not at the end of a Catactact wire.

FALSE ECONOMY.

It is announced that Mr. Arthur H. Frankland is leaving the city hall to accept a position with a prominent real estate firm. Mr. Frankland was recommended some time ago by Assessment Commissioner Porman for the post of assessment commissioner at a salary of \$2100. In accordance with the long-standing traditions of the city hall, the recommendation was turned down, and Mr. Frankland, with his twelve years' experience and intimacy with city hall affairs, is set free to use his knowledge against the city instead of for it. A lot of bright men have served the city until service became too great a sacrifice, and their talents were properly recognized elsewhere. R. J. Fleming, W. T. White, Cecil B. Smith, H. L. Drayton, W. C. Chisholm, are a few names that occur at once in this connection. Mr. Frankland joins this list, and no doubt has a fine career ahead of him.

The city council that sits in judgment on such men and rejects their services for something cheaper, sets a standard by which the voters ought to be able to measure it.

TAMMANY WINS AGAIN.

New York, by a large majority, has again bent itself to the yoke of Tammany. This, too, notwithstanding full exposure of the methods that have

made Tammany the synonym for wholesale political fraud and corruption, and of the heavy toll levied upon the people both directly and indirectly. Tammany, if it has not the harmlessness of the dove, has certainly more than its full share of the wisdom of the serpent. When threatening clouds become too ominous it can always go outside its charmed circle and prevail upon some prominent man of reputed independence and integrity to carry its standard and revive the hope in alienated Democrats that the city's administration will take a turn.

MUSICAL EXAMINATIONS.

Editor World: In reply to Enquirer's search for light on this subject, it may be said that while the Conservatory and the College of Music claim to be affiliated with the University of Toronto, in real fact they are as much affiliated with the university as we of this globe are affiliated with the ring of Saturn. The university allows them to use this reference as to standing, but gains nothing from these institutions, not even loyalty to its own examinations. The university holds its examinations in music, both theoretical and practical, but neither of the affiliated institutions officially send their pupils, only a few going at the instance of, here and there, one of its teachers. They hold their own examinations, and their own teachers do most of the examining. The standards are not the same, and here a funny thing comes to light. The board of music studies of the university or whatever the body may be called, that sets the curricula, determines the standard and chooses the examiners, is largely composed of teachers in one of these two institutions, who may be expected to retain their loyalty to the concern which engages them, yet the "high-brows" in the park sit complacently by and let the university musical policy be outlined by the teachers in schools which send no pupils—or at best, only a few—to the university exams. Enquirer asks where does the university come in? Ans.—It doesn't come in.

Enlarging Priest's Residence.

Very extensive alterations are to be made to the R. C. Priest's Rectory at Trenton, Ont., for which Architects Ellis and Connery, Toronto, are preparing plans.

Jesuit Fathers in Earthquake Business.

CLEVELAND, O., Nov. 2.—A chain of stations across the country operated under the direction of the Jesuit Fathers of America, for the purpose of making seismic observations and records, has been established. Headquarters are in Cleveland.

AT OSGOODE HALL.

ANNOUNCEMENTS.

Motions set down for single court for Wednesday, 3rd inst., at 11 a.m.:
1. Piers v. Waldman.
2. Wilson v. Sons of England.
3. Turner v. Stoddart.
4. Cummings v. Barnett.

Peremptory list for non-jury court for Wednesday, 3rd inst., at 11 a.m.:
1. Mackenzie v. Maple Mountain.
2. Brennan v. Cameron.
3. Parrot v. McLean.
4. Re Spurr and Penny.
5. Jewell v. Broad.

Non-Jury Assize Court.

Peremptory list for non-jury assize court Wednesday, Nov. 3, at city hall, at 10:30 a.m.:
148. Leckie v. Marshall.
147. Mickelson v. Strathely.
111. Worts v. Eaton.
90. Willis v. Colville.

Master's Chambers.

Before Cartwright, K.C. Master.
Hunter v. J. Rausbury-Towers (Highington), for plaintiff, moved on consent for order dismissing action and vacating certificate of its pendency with costs payable by plaintiff. Order made.
Spader v. Sutherland-Cavell (Millar & H.), for defendant, moved on consent for an order dismissing action without costs.

Drouillard v. Drouillard-F. McCarthy, for defendant, moved for an order for further examination of plaintiff (F. L. Bastard), for plaintiff, contra. Reserved.

Penman v. Douglas-J. R. Code, for defendant, moved to change venue from Toronto to Ottawa. Bangs (Arnold & G.), for plaintiff, contra. Adjourned for a week to allow of cross-examination of defendant on his affidavit.

Tully v. Douglas-J. R. Code, for defendant, moved to change venue from Toronto to Ottawa. Bangs (Arnold & G.), for plaintiff, contra. Adjourned for a week to allow of cross-examination of defendant on his affidavit.

Clarkson v. Hutchinson-Raney (Mills & Co.), for plaintiff, moved for an order allowing substitutional service on agent for defendant, who is at present abroad. Order made. Time for appearance extended until 4th December.

Tully v. Douglas-J. R. Code, for defendant, moved to set aside a default judgment. H. S. Rose, K.C., for plaintiff, contra. Order made on terms. Pleadings to stand and notice of trial to be given for Whitley sittings on 8th instant, with leave to defendant to move to postpone. Cause to plaintiff in any event, but if postponement granted then costs forthwith.

Semon v. Young-F. S. Brown, for plaintiff, on motion to compel defendant to answer certain questions. T. N. Phelan, for defendant, contra. Judgment: As to certain questions to answer them might be prejudicial to defendant in his business. They therefore need not be answered, as in view of what plaintiff admits and of the ground of the defence, the alleged misconduct of the plaintiff, they are not relevant to the issue. The motion is dismissed with costs to the defendant in the cause.

Judge's Chambers.

Before Riddell, J.
Re Donald Campbell-F. W. Harcourt, K.C., for infants, moved for an order for payment out of certain moneys in court for purpose of building a house. To be spoken to again.

Re Mary McCoy Estate-Eric Armour, for Robert McCoy, executor, moved, for administration order. D. L. McCarthy, K.C., for beneficiary, contra. Order made staying proceedings in surrogate court. Issue directed, to be tried at the next non-jury sittings at Belleville. Costs reserved until final disposition.

Re Mary A. Bine-G. G. Plaxton, for Eva Crawford, a grandchild, moved for an order for payment out of the residue in court to applicant's credit. No one contra. Matter to be referred to official guardian and to be spoken to again.

Re Jessie Wallace-F. W. Harcourt, K.C., for administrator, moved for an order for payment into court of certain

moneys to the credit of the heirs of Jessie Wallace, other than the widow. No one contra. Order made, all interested parties to be notified by registered letter.

Re Joseph Porter-F. W. Harcourt, K.C., for all parties entitled, moved for an order, for distribution of certain moneys in court. No one contra. Order made. Certain debts to be paid and moneys to remain in court.

Colonial Investment and Loan v. Spooner-A. B. Cunningham (Kings-ton), for defendants. A. M. Macdonell, K.C., for plaintiff, contra. Judgment: An appeal from the judgment clerk, on the question of taking the accounts in a mortgage action. I am of opinion that amount found due is right and that this appeal must be dismissed with costs or a chamber motion. These costs may at the option of the plaintiffs be added to the mortgage debt.

Tinsley v. St. Clair Tunnel-F. Aylesworth, for mother, moved for an order for payment out of court of \$200 out of shares of two elder sons. Judgment: An appeal from the judgment clerk, on the question of taking the accounts in a mortgage action. I am of opinion that amount found due is right and that this appeal must be dismissed with costs or a chamber motion. These costs may at the option of the plaintiffs be added to the mortgage debt.

The King v. Lee Hing-L. F. Heyd, K.C., for defendant, moved for an order varying the bail order by allowing deposit of marked cheque for \$2000 in favour of the crown attorney instead of providing two sureties of \$1500 each. No one contra. Order made.

Re John Deyell, Lunacy-R. J. McLaughlin, K.C., for petitioner, on motion to declare lunatic, asked enlargement. Enlarged one week.

Synia v. McGregor-H. E. Rose, K.C., for plaintiff, moved for order by way of appeal from the order of the master in chambers dismissing motion for judgment for possession on default in a mortgage action. L. F. Heyd, K.C., for defendant, contra. Enlarged until Thursday, 4th inst., at 10 a.m.

Re Brundage-J. M. Ferguson, for petitioner, on motion to set aside a default judgment of Oct. 15, 1909. F. W. Harcourt, K.C., for infant. Order made.

Re Cuban Realty Co.-J. A. Macintosh, for petitioner, moved for order to wind up company. W. J. McWhinney, K.C., and J. F. Hollis, for the company, contra. W. E. Middleton, K.C., for the Bank of N. A., opposed the application. To be spoken to again on 5th inst.

Lockie v. Marshall-G. Bell, K.C., for defendant, moved for order for issue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad test directed to certain persons in Montreal to appear at trial in Toronto, and to produce certain papers. Order made.

Single Court.
Before Tietzel, J.
Saskatchewan Land and Homestead Co. v. Leaday-G. Kappel, K.C., and C. Kappel, for the Leadays and A. J. R. Snow, K.C., for the Moores, on appeal from the certificates of the master-in-ordinary. A. B. Cunningham (Kington), for plaintiffs, contra. Argument of these appeals resumed from yesterday and judgment given dismissing first appeal as to items 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15 and reserving judgment as to items 10, 11 and 17. On the second appeal the amount allowed for cordwood is reduced to \$300, or at the rate of \$160 per cord for five years, and as to remaining points judgment reserved.

Trial Court.
Before Falconbridge, C.J.
Burch v. Flummerfelt-A. C. Kington, for plaintiffs, M. J. McCarron, contra. Judgment: I allow the declaration of Johnson Burch to be filed as part of the history of the making of the conveyance relied upon by defendant, but it is not evidence of the facts therein stated and I entirely disregard it. It is quite clear that the money paid for the land was the money requested to Johnson Burch by his mother's will. Johnson's habits were such that his mother provided that all legal claims to him should be invested or applied to the purchase of land, to be held in trust by her executors during his natural life, and to be equally divided among his children. The means adopted to carry out the wishes of the testatrix consisted in taking a deed from the vendor of the lot in question to the "lawful children of heirs of Johnson Burch." The introduction of the word "children" renders unnecessary the consideration of whether there is any infirmity in the grant by reason of the absence of a particular estate. The statute R.S.C., c. 119, sec. 2 would no doubt suffice to cure the objection in any event. Then as to the contention that J. B. had acquired a title by length of possession, the answer to this contention is that J. B. knew of the will and must be assumed to have taken the lands under trusts of same, and his possession ought not under the circumstances, to be treated as adverse. The case is a pretty hard one on defendant, who has no doubt expended a good deal of money for and on behalf of J. B. under the expectation of getting the property. The plaintiffs offered in open court to pay the defendant the funeral expenses, amounting to \$50 (including the minister's fee) paid by Burch, and this offer I shall expect them to carry out. There will be judgment for plaintiffs for possession of the lands and setting aside the conveyance from J. B. to the defendant, and \$1 for the defendant's costs. Thirty days' stay.

Before Riddell, J.
Whichey v. Nott Trust Co.-J. H. Moss, K.C., and C. A. Moss, for plaintiff. A. W. Anglin, K.C., and B. C. H. Cassels, for defendant. Judgment: The Dominion Copper Co., a mining company operating in British Columbia, issued, June 1, 1905, to the face value of \$1,000,000. These were secured by mortgage to defendants of same date, and the plaintiff became the holder of \$1,000,000 thereof. In May, 1907, defendant company advertised for offerings of such bonds for redemption. Plaintiff offered his at \$2. Defendants redeemed other bonds, but not those of the plaintiff. On Nov. 6, 1908, plaintiff sued, claiming in the first instance breach of trust by the defendants as trustees, and by an amendment, specific performance of the contract, which he says had been made, or for damages in lieu thereof. No charge of collusion, fraud or other impropriety is made against the defendants, nor could any such be made, but it is claimed that they have misinterpreted their deed of trust, and are liable as for a breach of their trust. Plaintiff claims that the deed of trust, if he be held entitled to recover in contract at all, I find that the market price of the bonds at the time of the breach was 75—his damages will then be \$750. The same consideration will also prevent him from recovering as a trustee. The defendants have in the premises acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust, if there was one. I am also of the opinion that the provisions in the trust deed protect the defendants, nor could any such be considered necessary to pass upon the question. The action will be dismissed with costs—30 days' stay.

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