

the different parts of the commonwealth then assembled in London would be the most effective means of cooperating if the time should come when that might become necessary and cooperation be agreed upon.

I have read these extracts also because I wish to give now to the house a statement more in detail of Canada's war action. It will be seen that in working out the plan we have, we have had much in mind the statements that were made as to what would likely in the future prove to be most helpful should Canada wish to cooperate with the United Kingdom and other members of the commonwealth in time of war.

The government, I need scarcely say, has been giving continuous consideration to the question of the most feasible and effective measures which Canada could take in the furtherance of the great task that now lies before us. I may be allowed to quote from a statement which I made to this house on March 30 of this year, when I said:

While another world war will, I trust, never recur, it is desirable nevertheless to consider some questions which would arise in the event of our participation in such a conflict. That participation could not be passive or formal, nor could it be unplanned or irresponsible. It would be necessary to consider in consultation with others involved and with regard to the objectives and operations of the enemy, what would be the most effective form our action and our cooperation could take.

It is clear that the conditions determining the nature of participation in such a conflict have undergone a great change since the last war. The balance of world power has shifted, and Canada has to keep its Pacific as well as its Atlantic coast in mind. From both the military and the economic aspect, the attitude of the United States would be immensely more important for the world and for us, than twenty years ago. The weapons and tactics of war have materially changed; naval conditions have perhaps not greatly altered, so far as the sea reaches, but armies have become mechanized, great Maginot or Siegfried lines bar the possibility of rapid infantry advance. Aeroplanes have brought new resources and scope to other arms in joint operations, and have in themselves given war new range, new flexibility and new terrors. Mechanization on land and in the air, and the colossal demands for supplies and renewed equipment, demands which would begin far beyond where the demands of the last war left off, greatly increase the importance of the economic factor, the indispensability of adequate supplies and staying power-factors in which the democratic countries are overwhelmingly strong.

It is not possible at this stage to forecast the character and requirement of the titanic conflict which has already commenced and which threatens the peace not of Europe only but of the entire world. We know the present alignment of nations and can in some measure conceive the economic and strategic factors inherent in the present situation. We

[Mr. Mackenzie King.]

cannot, however, be certain as to what other countries may enter the conflict on one side of the struggle or the other, and the consequent readjustment both of tasks to be met and of contributions to that end. We have vivid in our memories the experience of the last war, from which we have much to learn both as to heroic endeavour to be emulated and mistakes to be avoided. It is clear, however, that in many vital respects the conditions of the present struggle differ very greatly from those of the last, and that we cannot simply assume that the methods and objectives of 1914 are applicable to 1939. We must frame our policy in the light of our knowledge of the present situation and the best information we can obtain as to the probable course of future developments. To this end, as I have already indicated, we have been and shall of course remain in close consultation with the government of the United Kingdom, so that the assistance Canada is to render, if it is to have the greatest effectiveness, shall not be unplanned and irresponsible.

The primary task and responsibility of the people of Canada is the defence and security of Canada. The Minister of National Defence defined these needs in this house on February 15, 1937, as reported on page 892 of *Hansard*, when he stated:

National security, national defence, the direct defence of Canada, of our coastal areas, our ports, our shipping terminals, our territorial waters, the focal areas of our trade routes adjacent to our harbour mouths—these are the matters dealt with in these estimates.

This involves, in the first instance, military measures of defence. I have already outlined the steps which have been taken to safeguard the situation by calling out the active militia and the naval and air forces. Further measures will be taken in the directions where the need proves most imperative.

Again, we must provide for internal security and guard against sabotage, disturbance of vital military and economic establishments, and against hostile propaganda. A wide range of economic defence measures must be considered. The outbreak of war involves a tremendous upheaval both in international and in internal trade. It involves the redirection of many energies, the intensification of some forms of effort, the reduction of those less vitally necessary. It involves vigilant action to furnish the necessary financial support for the military measures to be taken, and to maintain the credit and the financial relations of Canada. As I said this afternoon, profiteering must and will be rigidly controlled. Close cooperation with the provinces and with representatives of industry and agri-