April 13, 1967

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Mr. KLEIN: As I understand it, one of the prerequisites would be to establish immediately a neutralized zone. Instead of imposing that condition as a first or one of the primary conditions, which seems to be impossible at the moment, do you think it would be useful to get both sides to agree to allow the entry of equal numbers of UN peace troops which would be used as standby peace corps in the event that negotiations could begin and ultimately reach a point where the troops could be used for peacekeeping operations or peace restoring, whatever you want to call it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I still do not fully understand the question. What I have said is that I am sure if peace is restored there will have to be an assumption of responsibility by the international community for a presence, I think a paramilitary presence, in the nature of the traditional kind of organization which we have in mind when we talk about a peacekeeping operation. Now, whether that is the United Nations or a body made up of Asian powers or Asian and African powers or a body made up of the Geneva powers, I cannot say. It is well known that North Vietnam has said that the Vietnam problem is no business of the United Nations. One might conclude from that that it would not agree to a peacekeeping operation provided for by the United Nations— I do not know, but it is clear in my mind that if in this complicated situation we are to have any stability following the cessation of hostilities there would have to be an international presence of some kind.

Mr. KLEIN: May I just ask you one last question? Do you consider that if the United States had unconditionally withdrawn from South Vietnam that Sukarno might have been able to stay in power in his own country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know that I can give you a satisfactory answer to that. The United States has said, as a result of the conference at Manila some months ago, that after certain conditions had been established it would remove its troops within six months from Vietnam. I am not suggesting that the United States should withdraw its troops now. I do not think anyone is seriously proposing that at the present time.

Mr. KLEIN: No, but do you feel the fact that the United States has taken a stand in South Vietnam has contributed to the downfall of Sukarno?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think that there were many things that contributed to the downfall of Sukarno; the boldness, the determination of those who were prepared to avoid certain kinds of incursions may have contributed to this. I am not really able to fully assess that.

Mr. KLEIN: Thank you.

(Translation)

The CHAIRMAN: I think Mr. Forest has a few questions to ask.

Mr. FOREST: I have only a few questions because the matter has been discussed at length in the past few days. In the world, today, the tendency is to allow countries to determine their own political affiliation. In paragraph 17, you say that you feel that the constitutional reforms in South Vietnam would seem to indicate the possibility of an election, between now and the end of the year, which might bring about a fully representative government in that country. You also state, in paragraph 16, that the crucial problem is the possible representa-