

of the stockpile at those sites until their destruction. It also provides for continuous monitoring of the destruction process to ensure that no CW is retained or diverted. These provisions come into force immediately a state party declares any CW and continue until the weapons are completely destroyed. Destruction of all declared CW stocks was to begin 2 years after entry into force and be concluded 10 years after entry into force—by the end of April 2007.

At the same time, it was intended that industry and other inspections (such as university, defence research and other laboratories) would commence immediately after state party declarations of relevant production of chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 had been made. In addition, inspections of facilities producing Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOCs), organic chemicals not listed in the schedules to the convention, were set to start in 2001, the fourth year after entry into force. By this stage the industry inspection regime would be expanding as the destruction programme was gearing up towards completion. The industry inspection system would continue in perpetuity: indeed there is no implication in the CWC that at any stage industry verification should be a secondary activity to CWC destruction verification.

Contrary to this vision, in the first five years of the convention, verification activity concentrated largely on existing CW stocks, former CW production facilities and CW destruction plants, while industry inspections were relatively neglected. Since the first review conference there has been some progress in rectifying these imbalances. However destruction of existing stockpiles has been subject to continuing delays and postponement, meaning that the OPCW will be involved in verifying destruction long after it had intended.³¹

One of the other significant issues that has confronted the OPCW is its possible role in reducing the risk of terrorists acquiring and using chemical weapons. To some extent the CWC did encompass measures to deal with this by emphasizing the requirement for national implementation measures by states parties. The OPCW has been active in encouraging and assisting states to have the requisite national measures in place, including penal sanctions for individuals and organizations that flout the goals of the convention. The OPCW closely monitors states' progress and provides legal and other assistance. While the OPCW has a clearly defined role in ridding the world of CW stockpiles that might be seized by terrorists for their ready use, the peaceful global chemical industry is so vast that achieving total security of all chemicals and chemical precursors that might be used by terrorists to make their own chemical weapons is impossible. Such security must be provided by industry itself with the support and encouragement of governments.

Similarly the OPCW is not mandated to be involved in controlling imports and exports of chemicals and dual-use equipment and its verification system is therefore not geared toward this goal. The Australia Group, an informal grouping of like-minded states which coordinate their export control policies, is outside the convention framework. Nonetheless its existence causes some friction with developing country CWC states parties, which argue that as treaty members in good standing they should not be subject to such additional constraints on their economic development. While this is a constant refrain in meetings of states parties, the issue has to date not constrained the operation of the OPCW or its verification regime.

³¹ As of April 2004, only 12.37 percent of the 71,000 metric tons of declared CW had been destroyed. The 6 states that have declared CW are Albania, India, Libya, Russia, South Korea and the US.