

backed communist China, pursuant to what the Peking Government feels was an obligation arising out of recognition.

"I ask three questions, Mr. Speaker. The first one is this. Should we recognize mainland China until we have reason to believe that our act will not result in deterioration of relations other than the opposite? My second question is this. Should we recognize mainland China if our act will give rise to misinterpretation of our attitude in the countries of Asia; that is, if those countries were to say that since Canada and other Western powers have recognized communist China, there is no point in their resisting the growing influence of the Peking Government, not only in international affairs, but in domestic affairs as well. My third question is this. Should we not also bear in mind the effect of recognition by Canada and by other countries on Peking's position among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia? They might take out of that act of recognition the view that they would be free to undermine the national interest of those countries by being willing then to transfer their loyalties wholly to the Peking regime.

"These are questions which we are weighing extremely carefully. It is, moreover, a matter of some concern that in the past year communist China has given us little warrant to believe that they have much conception of their responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. As a result of Mr. Dulles' visit to Taiwan in October last, a joint communique was issued by Chiang Kai-Shek and Mr. Dulles, to the effect that the nationalist government would not resort to force as the means of returning to the mainland. It is disturbing to find, however, that no similar renunciation of force has been made by the Government of communist China in respect of their intentions towards Formosa and the offshore islands. I am not discussing at this moment the place of the offshore islands but I am merely saying that there is on the part of the Peking Government, no manifestation of intention corresponding to that which was given by the nationalist government. That is their right. The mere fact that they have not done that is not necessarily an indication that we should not recognize China. But we are equally free to judge that in such circumstances, recognition might be of little value and advance none of our interests.

"It is for these reasons that it is the view of this Government that we must go carefully. We should take the initiative in limited fields--in fields of trade and in other ways to which I have referred--and we should take every opportunity that presents itself to overcome the causes of discord between the West and Peking China. We must be patient. We should not be hasty. Otherwise we may undo the good work that has already been accomplished in laying the basis for progress

towards the goal of removing the occasions for misunderstanding now existing between Canada and communist China.

"Whether this process will be followed by recognition is to be seen; but I say this emphatically, that it will depend upon the success that we have in improving our relations in limited fields, and our assessment of the advantage to be gained by such an act. We have never stated that we will never recognize the Peking Government. In the Prime Minister's words:

'The question of the recognition of Red China is one that has been receiving consideration for the last several years and the question is continually and continuously before members of the Government.'

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STATEMENT ON DEFENCE

(Continued from P. 3)

it is expedient that ownership and custody of the nuclear warheads should remain with the United States. The requirements of Canadian and United States legislation on atomic energy will continue to apply and there will be no change in Canada's responsibility for regulating all flights of aircraft over Canadian territory.

"The Canadian and United States Governments have assumed joint responsibility for the air defence of Canada and the continental United States (including Alaska) and have implemented their responsibilities through the establishment of the North American Air Defence Command. The Canadian Government exercises with the United States Government joint responsibility for the operations of the Command including the use of defensive nuclear weapons, if necessary. In the event that these defensive weapons are made available for use by NORAD, they could be used only in accordance with procedures governing NORAD's operations as approved in advance by the two Governments. Such weapons, therefore, would be used from Canadian territory or in Canadian air space only under conditions previously agreed to by the Canadian Government.

"Decisions as to the procedures concerning custody and control of nuclear warheads for use by Canadian Forces operating under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander in the North Atlantic Ocean will be subject to negotiation with appropriate NATO partners and those Commanders.

"I feel sure Hon. Members will recognize the gravity of the decisions that we in Parliament are called upon to make in these defence matters by reason of the almost unbelievable nature of the world in which we live. I would like to emphasize the Government's desire to ensure the security of Canada by all efficient and reasonable means at our disposal and in concert with our strong and trustworthy allies."