

William Maley (Australian Defence Force Academy) asked Paul Heinbecker to comment on the extent Canada's human security objectives (especially people as opposed to state-centred elements) at the Security Council contradict the objectives of other Security Council members. Paul Heinbecker reminded participants that Canada received most votes in the Security Council election. He expanded on the question by saying that the human security agenda might have been relatively successful in that election campaign because Canada is not a threatening country.

Questions about intervention included first, what are the criteria for military intervention? More specifically, how does one justify intervention against the Serbs on behalf of the Albanians and not against Turks on behalf of the Kurds, for instance? Furthermore, how to ensure that action is not simply a function of power politics (which certainly appeared so in the case of Kosovo)? Second, William Maley asked Paul Heinbecker to address the "selective indignation" directed at the Serbs in the context of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) activities which impacted negatively human rights. Paul Heinbecker replied to the first set of questions by saying that the intervention in Kosovo was not a function of state interests. Instead, what propelled NATO to act was the level of atrocities committed by the Serbs against the Albanians. There was no strategic interest (such as oil or diamond reserves) behind the Kosovo intervention. The international community, including Canadians, simply can not stand by in the face of a genocide. Moreover, it is questionable to compare the treatment of Kurds by the Turks as being the same as the treatment of Albanians by the Serbs. (After all, many Kurdish refugees fled to Turkey, not to neighbouring countries. Meanwhile Serbia was not the favoured destination of fleeing Albanians.) The scale and nature of the Serb-led atrocities in Kosovo warranted intervention more acutely. Addressing William Maley's question, Paul Heinbecker said that the Canadian government never condoned the independence of Kosovo (under the KLA leadership, especially) and there is hope that the upcoming Fall 2000 elections in Kosovo will not result in a complete KLA victory.

William Maley asked why is the Uniting for Peace resolution, adopted in 1950 by the General Assembly, not used more frequently in cases such as Kosovo, for instance. Paul Heinbecker replied that in the case of the Kosovo conflict, the chance of the Uniting for Peace resolution not being accepted was simply too high. Then, NATO's action in the face of a veto would be exceedingly difficult. The perception that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was illegal and undermined the UN system, on one hand, and the view that the action was justified and should not be condemned so drastically, on the other, brings the necessity of building the human security architecture to a head. Given the roles of NATO and the G-8 in that particular intervention, mechanisms should perhaps be developed to act as a check on the decisions of the Security Council.

Minister Axworthy was asked to first, take up the possible realisation of creating a UN rapid reaction force. Second, he was challenged to defend the Canadian-led OAS mission to Lima. "Benign interventions" proved to be questionable in the past. How does one square this legacy with the decision to intervene in a post-colonial country such as Peru?