defendant's wife, for the purpose of being communicated by her to her husband. The court held that there was evidence in this case to go to the jury of the defendant's knowledge of the character of his dog. In *Baldwin* v. *Cassella*, 41 Law J. Rep. N. S. Exch. 167, the guilty dog was kept at the stables of the defendant, under the care and control of the defendant's coachman; the defendant supposed the dog to be harmless, but the coachman knew that the dog was of a mischievous nature. The court held that knowledge on the part of such a servant was enough to fix his master's liability. Last week, in the case of *Appleby* v. *Percy*, in the Court of Common Pleas, the defendant was a licensed victualler, and kept the dog which bit the plaintiff on the premises where the defendant carried on business. On two former occasions the dog had flown at customers, who had complained of its conduct to the waiters at the bar of the public-house. The question for the court was whether these complaints were sufficient to prove the defendant's knowledge of the character of the dog. At *nisi prius*, Mr. Justice Honyman had directed a nonsuit, and this ruling was upheld by Mr. Justice Brett. On the other hand, Lord Coleridge and Mr. Justice Keating thought that there was evidence of the *scienter* to go to the jury. Thus we find that, after repeated discussions in courts of law, eminent judges are at variance upon what seems to be a very simple point, and so we are induced to suppose that this difference of judicial opinion is rather the result of external causes than of the intrinsic difficulty of the matter itself. The fact is, that the injustice of a law which refuses to a plaintiff a remedy for a wrong unless he can show that somebody else has previously been the victim of a similar wrong, insensibly inclines the minds of judges to relax the rule. Surely the time has arrived when the legislature should be asked to class human beings with cattle and sheep, and to protect "person" to the same extent as it does "property." By 28 and 59 Vict., chap. 60, the owner of every dog is liable in damages for injury done to any cattle (including horses, *Wright* v. *Pearson*, 38 L. J. Rep. N. S., Q. B. 312) or sheep by his dog, and it is not necessary for the party seeking such damages to prove a previous mischievous propensity in such dog, or the owner's knowledge of such previous propensity. No one has ever attempted to show that this Act has been burdensome or unfair to owners of dogs; and, if we may judge from the rarity of actions under this statute, the effect of it has been to induce owners of dogs of doubtful character to put an end to the possibility of the dogs doing harm. If the Act were extended in the way we have suggested, all dogs of a spiteful, snapping or biting disposition would either be kept under the control of collar and chain, or be deemed to be no longer worth the animal tax. The indignant words of the Lord Chief Justice, uttered on Monday last in the case of *Hockaday* v. *Wheeler* —"What business had a man to keep a savage brute like this? he might as well keep a lion"—would then acquire real potency. As it is, people seem to be utterly indifferent as to the safety of their neighbours; and whenever a plaintiff seeks damages for the bite of a dog, the defendant strains every nerve to prove that, while the whole neighborhood knew the dog to be an awkward customer, the defendant supposed the dog to be as harmless as a lamb. Meanwhile, lawyers are frightened by mad dogs in Fleet Street, while in Westminster Hall almost as much confusion is created by eminent judges differing on the simplest and most threadbare question known to the law.—*Law Journal.*

In *Leonard* v. *Stover* the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recently decided that the owner of a building with a roof so constructed that snow and ice collecting on it from natural causes will naturally and probably fall into the adjoining highway, is not liable to a person injured by such a fall upon him, while travelling upon the highway, provided the entire building is at the time let to a tenant who has covenanted to make "all needful and proper repairs, internal and external." The same court decided in *Shepley* v. *Fifty Associates*, 101 Mass. 251; 3 Am. Rep. 346 and 106 Mass. 194; 8 Am. Rep. 318, that if the owner of the building has control of the roof he is liable.—*Albany Law Journal.*