

should contain any provision as to juries, and, if so, what? The gentleman to whom this subject was confided has written a very able and convincing paper, in which he takes up, firstly, the question of grand juries; and comes to the conclusion that they are not desirable. As to petit juries he was in favour of the omission from the constitution of any provision guaranteeing a right of trial by jury either in civil or criminal cases; though he recommended that there should be some way provided of giving assistance to the judge in the disposal of matters of fact by calling to his aid one or two intelligent, educated men in an advisory capacity. Another able paper was read on the selection, tenure, and compensation of the judiciary. The writer takes strong ground against the elective system, which, as he says, is practically unknown outside the United States. There it has admittedly worked badly. As the writer says: "No mere politician who owes his office to a party can be trusted to do exact and even-handed justice between the opposing litigants. We insist, with much reason, that our judges shall keep out of active politics while on the bench. It is not demanded, and is certainly not equally necessary, as to any other officer. Yet, strangely enough, we are not shocked by dragging the office itself into the whirlpool of party politics and allowing the candidates to engage in an unseemly, and often corrupt, struggle for its honours and emoluments. It would perhaps be an excellent thing could we enact and enforce the statute of Richard the Second, which declared, with much quaintness and some bluntness, that no person should be appointed by the appointing power to a justiceship 'that sueth either privately or openly to be put into the office, but only such as they shall judge to be best and most efficient.' Truly, a hard law for the chronic office-seeker, and one which would afford even scanty consolation for the technical individual, who, while objecting to any man seeking the office, saw no objection to placing himself where the office would have no difficulty in finding the man."

It will be remembered that the appointive system is in force in Massachusetts, with the result that that state has perhaps the ablest judiciary of any state in the Union. The writer also urges that the tenure of office should be during good behaviour and not for any short term; and that the compensation should be ample, not less than \$5,000, at least, to the judges of Superior Courts.