naval station at Simon's Bay, and a certain "suzerainty," which could be strained to the breaking-point as time went on. Steyn, the Free State president, with his usual lack of diplomac,, gave a plain statement of these designs in a speech just a year ago, and anyone vho studies the wording of most of Kruger's recent despatches and his replies to the enquiries of American and other newspapers, will see how he claims to act as champion of the whole of South Africa, though the difficulty is supposed to be with the Transvaal only. It was made plain to the British element in South Africa, and to the Home Government, that Britain must either make good her claim of paramountcy or give over the rule of South Africa to the Boers. As one of the Boers put it, there could not be two "bosses" in South Africa, and it became a question, which was it to be, Boer or Briton?

In pursuance of his policy of Napoleonizing South Africa, President Kruger, at the head of a delegation of three, went to London in 1884 to attempt to get a revention of 1884 distinctly prevents the Transvaal from making any treaty with a foreign power without the consent of Great Britain. Without trying to define the term "suzerainty," plain men will question the "sovereign independence" of a country whose autonomy was given as an act of grace, and which could not make its own treaties. But even if there were no suzerainty, the conduct of the Boer Government had rendered it liable to be called to account in a dozen ways under common international law.

Some people ask, was not the Boer Government justified in its recent policy, by the Jameson raid? The answer to that question is that the Jameson raid was the result of Boer tyranny and misrule, and not the cause of it. Had Kruger treated the Uitlanders as white men with natural rights, and had he not laid on burden after burden, and taken away right after right, with studied hostility towards British subjects in particular, there would have been no Jameson raid. The educational restrictions, the arming and fort building,



SCENE-MARKET SQUARE, JOHANNESBURG.

lease from all semblance of British control, and to get a formal confirmation of the encroachments he had been making on independent native tribes since the convention of 1881. He represented to Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for the colonies, that his burghers were discontented under the existing convention, which they felt implied interference with their internal affairs. The deputation drew up a draft of a new convention, in which the name of the Transvaal was changed to the "South African Republic," and in which the British suzerainty was expressly abolished. In discussing this draft, Lord Derby politely, but firmly, informed the deputation that "neither in form nor in substance was it such as Her Majesty's Government could agree to;" but that as the paramountcy of Great Britain was an obvious fact, and did not require a document to establish it, he had no objection to satisfying the susceptibilities of the Boers by accepting the change of name, and by omitting any specific use of the word "suzerainty," which Kruger had said was offensive to And so, clinging to the letter of this change. Kruger built up his claim that the Transvaal was now a "Sovereign International State," though the new con-

the prohibition of public meetings, and the iniquitous press law, and other grievances, all preceded the Jamesonraid. The people of Johannesburg and other Uitlander centres began to despair of any action from the British Government, and yet, while agitating persistently for their rights, the majority of the members of the "National Union," formed at the time to obtain redress for the people's grievances, publicly and privately assured the President that they had no desire to upset the republican form of government. And there is complete evidence that these sentiments were genume with the Uitlanders at that time. Dr. Jameson's brave, but quixotic raid, as it was carried out, put the people of Johannesburg in a false position, and they have been unjustly charged with cowardice. It is not denied by the National Union leaders that an agreement was made with him to come to their aid. But after smuggling in 3,000 rifles, the leaders found that more had to be done to make the rising a success—for it was intended to seize Pretoria, whose forts, then under repair, were exposed and ill-garrisoned-and so they sent word to Jameson to wait on the Bechuanaland border till they notified him. Their object was not merely to