

nomination meeting, their respective resignations should have been in writing as required by subsection 3 of section 129 and filed with the clerk of the municipality previous to nine o'clock p. m. on the 30th of December. A and B not having done this, are still in the field for the reeveship, and a poll must be held on Monday, January 5th, 1903, with their names on the ballot to decide this issue between them.

The Two Classes of Municipal Reforms.

The reforms which are destined to give us the model twentieth century city may be divided into two main classes, namely political reforms and Economic and social reforms. Disproportionate attention has been given to political reforms which are less fundamental than the economic and social reforms. Among the political reforms which are coming we may mention an extended use of the referendum. The people are going to insist upon voting upon an increasing number of measures. Very generally they now vote upon questions of indebtedness. They will hereafter vote upon other measures of equal importance, such for example as the question of franchise for public utilities.

Such measures are likely to be taken, either by proportional representation or otherwise, as to secure a representation of all classes and elements in the Legislative branch of the municipal government. In a general way the aim of political reform will be to unite a large degree of local liberty and a wide scope of municipal action with suitable central control. Constitutional restrictions and Legislative interference in municipal affairs will be greatly lessened, but state boards of control will be multiplied, and this is the way in which evidently the problem will be solved.

We have state boards of health which exercise control and supervision in local affairs. One state has a board of municipal accounts, which without interfering with any legitimate local action, renders valuable services to the cities of the state. Another state has a state sewerage commission, which must approve all new sewerage plants. In some cases state boards have more or less to do with local transportation corporations. Massachusetts has a state gas commission.—*Professor Ely, of Wisconsin University in "The Coming City."*

The electors of the Town of Essex voted recently on a by-law to grant a \$15,000 bonus to Mr. E. J. Philip, who is going into the manufacture of automobiles, gasoline engines and steam specialties. The by-law had a walk over, there being only two votes against it.

The Modern Telephone Co. have signed contracts for the establishment of a rural telephone service, embracing in its circuit Markham, Locust Hill, Whitevale, Green River and Brougham. About thirty farmers will be benefited by the service and have 'phones.

Municipal Ownership and Operation.

From "A Municipal Program" Published by the National Municipal League of the United States.

The methods which have been most advocated for the management of municipal properties and services may be classified under two heads, viz:

Those which are equivalent to a lease for a period of years, and those which involve the direct control and operation by the local government.

The principal arguments in favor of the lease system may be stated briefly as follows:

1st. That it is the quickest and easiest method for a city to obtain large sums of money or large annual revenues without borrowing, and that the success of this method will be in proportion to the length of the periods for which the franchises are granted.

2nd. That with city management there is sure to be a great deal of fraud and corruption in the procurement of labor and materials.

3rd. That municipal officials and legislators are so generally ignorant, negligent, or corrupt that they are incapable of conducting the public business with intelligence, efficiency, and economy.

4th. That by carefully drawn leases and agreements the city's interests can be fully protected and its revenue assured and increased.

5th. That under our form of government the requirements of party politics and the frequent changing of public employees make it impossible for the people to secure as good service at as reasonable rates as a private corporation.

6th. That under municipal operation the employees and patronage will be used for political, partisan, or factional purposes, to such an extent that the spoils system will be greatly strengthened, and it will become much more difficult for the people to overthrow a political machine.

The advocates of municipal ownership and operation reply to these arguments:

1st. That even if we should ignore the influence of a full treasury in encouraging folly and extravagance, it would still be true that neither the raising of money nor obtaining an income can justify a city in depriving its citizens and their posterity of the control of matters essential for their own service and protection, or in selling important privileges for much less than they are worth, or in granting them to persons whose private interests will thus be made adverse to those of the public.

2nd. That as such arrangements are practically certain to be unfair to the city, the evils which they will inflict upon the people will be much greater if the grants are made for long periods than if they are limited to short terms.

3rd. That in aggregate amounts and in multiplicity and variety of direct and indirect methods the bribery and corruption chargeable to corporations seeking and enjoying municipal franchises are undoubtedly far in excess of the totals of similar evils from all other sources combined, and that the way to abolish bribery is to abolish the corporations which do the bribing, by adopting the policy of municipal operation in every conceivable case.

4th. That if the city's representatives are unfit to conduct a business from year to year, it would be the height of folly to entrust them with the vastly more difficult and responsible task of selecting and installing a management which could not be changed for a long period of years.

5th. That in making a lease for fifty years the bribes are much larger, and the necessity for expert knowledge, shrewdness, sagacity, foresight and honesty is much greater, so that the damage resulting from the lack of suitable qualifications in the city's representatives is likely to be very much more than fifty times what it may be under a management that is limited to a single year and can then be changed by the voters if it is unsatisfactory.

6th. That under existing conditions the chances of any city obtaining a fifty years' or other long term agreement which will be entirely fair and desirable for the people, or of securing what might be even more difficult, a full and satisfactory enforcement of such an agreement if one could be made, seem to be too slight for serious consideration.

7th. That even if it was practicable to secure such an agreement and its continuous enforcement, its effect upon the character of the local government must necessarily be exceedingly injurious. A bad servant who can be dismissed is much better than a master from whom it is impossible to escape. Republican institutions are based upon the principle that the people should have the power to change their rulers without resorting to assassination or revolution, and a long lease of an important municipal service is simply the substitution of a limited monarchy for a popular government, so far as it relates to that particular function.

8th. That as the character of every republican government must depend in the last analysis upon the active interest of the voters, it is obvious that every lease or agreement which ties the hands of a local government and lessens its ability to serve and protect the voters must tend to diminish their interest in supporting or improving it. While it is not possible to strip a city government so entirely of power as to make it incapable of attracting the efforts or serving the purposes of bad men, it is possible to render it so powerless to accomplish good or restrain evil that the average citizen can no longer be induced to take an active interest in it.