

but devoid of emotion, desire, or aversion. They are the constant attendants of all conceptions; and whenever a correct conception merges from the hazy atmosphere of doubt into the clear skies of assurance, it becomes knowledge.

The subjective feelings of the Intellect, like all other subjective senses, sustain relations to outward things—that is, conceptions of outward things. The nature of these relations, of course, correspond with the nature of the feelings.

The two relations of the subjective feelings of the Intellect are that of excitement and that of assurance. For instance, a thing presented in perception, is in the relation of excitement; and the thing as contained in the conception so formed, is in the relation of assurance. This is all that need be added to what has already been said respecting the subjective feelings of the Intellect, as they are freely discussed in connection with knowledge.

The Will.

The Will is to man's nature what the executive power is to the State. Through it, all the behests, laws, and impulses of our nature are carried into execution. However powerful the impulses of our nature may be within us, they must all seek their appropriate gratification through the medium of the Will; and unless they found vent through this medium, a man would be in the helpless plight of one tied up to be consumed of the raging elements unable to provide their appropriate sustenance.

Were it not that the Will intervenes between every subjective feeling and its appropriate gratification, every subjective impulse would rush to its own gratification, irrespective of the claims or rights of all other subjective feelings. But through the interposition of the Will consent has first to be obtained; and it is a law of the Will that consent can never be obtained till all the rights and claims of contending subjective feelings have been deliberately weighed and a choice made.

The Will thus looks to the general good of the community, and never yields to the suasion of any particular subjective sense or class of senses, till convinced that they have stronger claims than any that oppose them, or that they will not interfere with the general rights of the community.

The Will is thus, in man's moral nature, something more than the mere executive power is in the State. It wields a legislative power along with it. It is, indeed, something of a despot, listening to all the petitions or claims of his subjects, using the assistance of the Intellect in forming his judgments, and giving his consent only to what has the strongest claims. Yet the Will differs in one point of character from the despot. The despot may will capriciously above, or contrary to, the strongest claims set forth by any section of his subjects. The Will can never do this. Though not subservient, perhaps, to a weak motive, or to those in the minority, it must itself be always subject to the strongest motive, or to those in the majority. The Will, then, having no power capriciously to withhold consent from the strongest motive, can never be called a despot. Perhaps, the kind of government which human nature most nearly resembles is a republic, of which the Will, as president, is head. The human will, like him, is invested with executive power. It has liberty of action, but in accordance only with the voices of the commonwealth; and though the head of all, it is yet the servant of all, or rather, of the majority.

Wherever the powers of the will are well developed, and man's nature properly disciplined, the motives for and against a certain course of conduct are well considered before consent is yielded. Where these powers and discipline are defective, consent is too readily accorded under the strong stimulus of some subjective motive, irrespective of the stimulus of others which are unthought of at the time. Persons in whom this method of decision is a prevailing trait are usually characterised as impulsive. They yield at once to the subjective impulse that may be uppermost in their minds; and bearing on the will at the time.

The Will, then, the balance on which all motives must be weighed, a scale with two opposing arms. On the one arm are placed all the motives in favour of a particular course of conduct; on the other, all the motives presenting claims in opposition to it. While the balance remains in perfect equilibrium, the subjective feeling of irresolution or indecision is the one predominant in the ego; but when the balance sways to one side under the influence of one class of motives, the subjective feeling of consent is aroused in the ego or subject in their favour; and to the others is left only the feeling of non-consent, not in all cases, but in this where their claim comes into antagonism with those of more preponderating influence.

Introductory Analysis of the Will.

There are, then, just three subjective states or feelings of the Will possible with reference to an act:—(1) That of indecision or irresolution, when the will is in a subjective state of