

vasions of Europe; a barrier sufficient in itself at present, while the only power that could become an invader is unable to keep the sea, which is ruled by a power unable to invade. At no distant day the stationary strength of Europe may be counterpoised by the increased strength of America; and the current of irruption, which for so many thousand years has proceeded from east to west, having reached the limits of its action, may recoil, and trace back its steps from the populous and mighty west to the reduced and prostrate east.

From commercial depredations the United States may not, for some years, be exempt. But their present ability is more than a match for any force that can be sent over sea for their invasion. In both ancient and modern times, large military expeditions, which depended on naval coöperation, have almost always been unsuccessful. As they exhaust the nation that assembles them, it is impossible to repair disasters by fresh succour. If any one part be lost or destroyed, the others being more or less dependent upon each other, cannot act thus mutilated. The unavoidable slowness of such enterprises gives an opportunity for preparation to the other party. And tempests of the sea are perils of daily occurrence and insurmountable difficulty. Admitting, however, that by an uncommon coincidence of fortunate accidents, an invasion were effected, and that all North America might be overrun by an experienced, well appointed army, it would nevertheless be impossible to overcome the inhabitants, or reconcile them to a yoke. The means of escape, of subsistence, and of sove-